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INTRODUCTION 
In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,1 the 
Supreme Court addressed whether two third-party participants in a 
fraudulent scheme, engineered by a corporate issuer, faced liability in 
a private securities lawsuit for harm caused by the issuer’s false and 
misleading corporate disclosures.  Though the inquiry would seem to 
be a matter of determining whether the participants’ deceptive, be-
hind-the-scenes conduct constituted a “primary” violation of the anti-
fraud prohibition found in SEC Rule 10b-5,2 the Court instead ans-
wered by interpreting the reliance element of the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action.  The Court held that there is no reliance, and hence no liabili-
ty, when the link between the third party’s actions and the resulting 
misrepresentation by the issuer is too remote or attenuated.3 
Conduct, reliance, and proximity, however, are conceptually dis-
tinct; by blending them together, Justice Kennedy’s opinion makes 
something of a doctrinal mishmash.  The dish is tasty enough to those 
who dislike strong securities class actions, with abundant probusiness 
dicta adding ample spice.4  But the recipe has few serious academic 
defenders, even among those who like its outcome,5 and has been the 
object of disgust for those who do not.6  The standard account is that 
1 552 U.S. 148 (2008).  The decision was five to three:  Justice Stevens wrote a 
lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, and Justice Breyer did not take 
part in the decision. 
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (declaring it unlawful to use “any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange” to commit fraud). 
3 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (“Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance 
upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that we find too re-
mote for liability.”).  
4 See, e.g., id. at 164 (“Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws 
could be deterred from doing business here.”); see also infra note 172. 
5 See A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta:  The Polit-
ical Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 233-34 
(defending Stoneridge as an attempt to limit the private right of action under Rule  
10b-5).  For a somewhat more sympathetic view, see Richard A. Booth, The Future of 
Securities Litigation, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 129, 135 (2009), which suggests that although 
the case could have been decided another way, it invited a thorough reconsideration 
of the role of causation in Rule 10b-5 litigation. 
6 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down:  A Critical Essay on Stoneridge In-
vestment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. 448, 450-51 
(2009) (describing the decision as one based on policy considerations rather than 
sound doctrine); Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme 
to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)?  The Disastrous Result and Reason-
ing of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 309 (2010) (characterizing Stoneridge as “in-
sulating culpable parties from private action liability when they did not directly partic-
ipate in the sale of securities”); Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability:  Does It Have a 
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the Court was, yet again, showing its reflexive antipathy toward private 
securities class actions, throwing whatever was at hand into the pot in 
order to achieve a business-friendly result.  As we shall see, most lower 
courts have read Stoneridge as doing little more than truncating third-
party liability via an especially strict reliance requirement. 
My sense is that both courts and commentators have paid too 
much attention to the dicta and too little to the holding.  Though I, 
too, would have decided the case differently, the substance of the aca-
demic criticism and the unimaginative way lower courts have read and 
applied the Court’s teachings are too simple.  In Stoneridge, as in the 
two other most recent Supreme Court decisions addressing securities 
class actions, Tellabs7 and Dura Pharmaceuticals,8 the Court articulated a 
more moderate test than it might have, even though all three held for 
the defendants.  Pure antipathy toward securities class action plaintiffs 
presumably would have led to more extreme holdings, which suggests 
that something different is going on. 
In this Article, I offer a novel reading of Stoneridge.9  There is a res-
pectable idea at work in the opinion, which we can refine.  The Court’s 
Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351, 393 (criticizing the majority for revis-
ing hundreds of years of fraud history “without any grounding in the language, legis-
lative history, or policy” underlying section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act); Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge—Escape from Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active, In-
tentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 180 (2008) (describing the Stone-
ridge decision as “clearly wrong”). 
7 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (hold-
ing that a complaint will survive dismissal under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) “only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of 
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw 
from the facts alleged”).  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Tellabs provoked criti-
cal concurrences by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito because of its moderation, but 
Justice Kennedy voted with the majority.  For a discussion of Tellabs’s implications, see 
James D. Cox, Randall Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause 
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?:  Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 421, 436-38.  In particular, the article noted, “Tellabs’s salience within securities 
litigation will come from its call for courts to focus on all aspects of the complaint, its 
requirement that inferences are to be drawn both for and against the plaintiff, and its 
enunciation of a somewhat malleable meaning for strong.”  Id. at 437. 
8 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005) (requiring securi-
ties complaints charging fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to plead loss 
causation by alleging an inflated price caused by the securities violation and a subse-
quent price decrease caused by the exposure of the truth in the market). 
9 My reading bears some similarity to one Ronald Colombo puts forward, though he 
ties the proper test for third-party liability to “principles of cooperation” derived from 
moral philosophy and theology.  See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 
61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 91-92 (2009) (using philosophical principles to determine the moral 
blameworthiness of acts undertaken by one who cooperates with wrongdoers). 
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choice of reliance as the crucial element indicates the Court’s comfort 
with having different liability outcomes in Rule 10b-5 cases depending 
on whether the action is an SEC enforcement or criminal prosecution 
(where reliance is not required) or private litigation (where it is).10  
Why might such a distinction make sense?  One possible answer 
comes by considering the extraordinary nature of the liability in pri-
vate fraud-on-the-market cases, which is based on the aggregate 
claims of all those who bought or sold from the time of the alleged 
primary misrepresentations to the date of corrective disclosure.  This 
figure can be staggeringly large, yet disconnected from any mea-
ningful reliance-in-fact requirement.  Even if the underlying conduct 
was wrongful, making a defendant pay such a large amount can seem 
severely disproportionate.  By contrast, in SEC enforcement actions, 
the monetary penalty varies based on a set of factors specifically tied 
to the gravity of the wrongdoing.11  In Part I, I expand on this idea 
and make my main argument:  that by emphasizing remoteness and 
attenuation in the context of private securities litigation, Stoneridge 
reinvigorates the idea of duty as a limitation on liability to open-
market investors in order to constrain the unique liability risk that 
defendants face. 
In Part II, I explore the risk of disproportion and make two 
claims.  First, fraud-on-the-market liability is an extraordinary remedy 
because it creates a potential recovery different from, and in excess of, 
normal conceptions of provable reliance damages.  Second, a hard 
look at the key elements of a Rule 10b-5 action—including scienter—
shows that securities fraud bears enough resemblance to negligence in 
terms of indeterminacy and precaution costs that a duty-based analysis 
makes sense.  Later in Part II, I also consider how Congress has tried 
to address the disproportionality problem explicitly.  Section 21D(f) 
of the Securities Exchange Act, added as part of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), purports to impose a propor-
tionate liability regime, drawn from similar reform efforts in tort law 
10 For more on the relationship between public and private securities law en-
forcement, and a proposal for bringing private litigation even more under the control 
of the SEC, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:  Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 
(2008).  Rose proposes greater oversight by the SEC to reduce focus on the implied 
private right and to achieve optimal deterrence.  Id. at 1305-06. 
11 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2006) 
(setting tiers of penalties, with maximum amounts, based on the presence of fraud, 
pecuniary gain, and losses suffered by investors). 
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at the state level.12  My argument is that this provision fails to do its 
job, thereby justifying judicial concern. 
Part III puts forth my duty-based reading of what the Stoneridge 
Court was struggling to say with its emphasis on attenuation and re-
moteness.  I explain that this kind of duty is different from the affir-
mative duty to speak, which is fairly narrow and circumscribed, and 
instead performs the tort law–like function of identifying a limited 
category of relational misconduct for which extraordinary fraud-on-
the-market liability is deserved.  Thinking of Stoneridge in this way gives 
meaning to portions of the opinion that otherwise might seem unin-
telligible, like the Court’s distinction between defendants who inhabit 
the realm of commerce versus the realm of finance, and shows that 
there is, in fact, ample room for third-party liability in the right kinds 
of cases.  Part IV explains that this perspective helps resolve the most 
common third-party liability problems, comparing and critiquing the 
overly restrictive way in which lower courts have responded to Stone-
ridge.  In Part IV, I take a critical look at the “attribution” test for pri-
mary liability, which lower courts seem to assume has survived Stone-
ridge.  Though that reading may be formally correct, I suggest that a 
duty-based reading obviates the need for it. 
Because I do not expect to resolve the lingering confusion and in-
consistency in current doctrine simply by reading Stoneridge differently, 
a further legislative fix is necessary.  The cases are just too gerryman-
dered to operate fairly or effectively.  So, in Part V, I suggest a revision 
of proportionate liability that is fair and workable in light of the analy-
sis herein.  With such a regime in place, concerns about excessive lia-
bility should diminish considerably, and with that, we can think in 
terms of expanding third-party liability beyond what the Court permits, 
including the restoration of aiding-and-abetting liability. 
I.  STONERIDGE:  THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY 
AND THE ROLE OF RELIANCE 
In Stoneridge, plaintiffs alleged that two large vendors of cable tele-
vision set-top boxes, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, had entered into 
deceptive transactions with a cable-system operator, Charter Commu-
nications, and backdated or falsified documents to disguise the 
12 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) § 21D(f), 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (imposing a framework of joint, several, and proportionate liability 
on persons covered under the Act).   
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sham.13  Plaintiffs argued that by participating in Charter’s scheme to 
inflate revenues with sham transactions, the vendors assumed respon-
sibility for Charter’s lies about its financial condition.  This claim 
raised a host of interpretive questions, many of which the parties or the 
many amici addressed during briefing and argument.  Had the two 
third-party defendants engaged in a deceptive device or contrivance of 
their own, rather than simply assisting Charter’s?  If so, was it in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security?  Did the plaintiffs ade-
quately plead scienter, reliance, and loss causation?  Of all these poten-
tial issues, the Court rested its holding solely on lack of reliance.14 
In retrospect, this fixation on reliance seems to be a simple and 
predictable extension of the Court’s 1994 holding in Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, which radically narrowed the 
scope of third-party liability by excluding aiding-and-abetting liability 
as an acceptable claim under Rule 10b-5.15  The fact that Stoneridge 
reads that way is hardly surprising, given that Justice Kennedy wrote 
both opinions and worked hard to make them seamless.  But any 
seeming inevitability is hindsight bias at work:  in fact, the two cases 
pose distinct issues and could readily support very different outcomes. 
In Central Bank, the Court rejected aiding-and-abetting liability for 
a number of reasons, textual as well as policy-based, including fear of 
excessive litigation.16  In dicta, the Court suggested, among other 
things, that aiding-and-abetting liability would allow defendants to be 
held “liable without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the ai-
der and abettor’s statements or actions.”17  Later, the Court repeated 
that a person who employs a manipulative device can be found pri-
marily liable, “assuming all of the requirements for primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5 [including reliance] are met,” but emphasized that 
it was leaving open the question of the scope of primary liability (i.e., 
13 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153-54 
(2008).  The plaintiffs also sued Charter and its accountants, but they settled that por-
tion of the case, thereafter turning entirely to the two third-party defendants for the 
remaining damages. 
14 See id. at 161 (“[W]e conclude respondents’ deceptive acts . . . are too remote to 
satisfy the requirement of reliance.”). 
15 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
16 See, e.g., id. at 189 (noting the particular “vexatiousness” of Rule 10b-5 litigation). 
17 Id. at 180.  The Court seems to have been heavily influenced by an article by 
Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 
CAL. L. REV. 80 (1981).  Fischel argued that Supreme Court jurisprudence limits all 
liability to what is permissible under the relevant statutory language, rather than under 
common law traditions.  Id. at 82. 
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what kind of conduct exceeds mere aiding and abetting so as to fall 
within the scope of the prohibition).18 
As commentators on Central Bank quickly pointed out, this em-
phasis on reliance was puzzling,19 and in the cases that followed, plain-
tiffs took the perfectly sensible position that so long as there was some 
causal link between the third party’s acts or omissions and the misin-
formation on which investors relied, the reliance element would be 
satisfied.  After all, the reliance requirement had long been seen as 
demanding just a “but for” causal relationship.20  If this were the case, 
the crucial question would simply be when a third party bears respon-
sibility for the public misstatement on which reliance is presumed.  
This inquiry goes entirely to the question of primary liability.  Lower 
courts famously split on this question, with the first case from the Ninth 
Circuit taking a relatively liberal approach and holding that responsibil-
ity follows whenever the third-party defendant substantially participated 
in the making of the misstatement.21  But other courts—notably the 
Second Circuit—soon staked out a much stricter position, insisting that 
primary liability arises only where there is some sort of public attribu-
tion of responsibility to the third-party defendant for the misstate-
ment.22  This latter view, which seemingly ruled out any liability for be-
18 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
19 See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5:  Chiarella’s Histo-
ry, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 887 (1995) (criticizing Central Bank’s 
departure from other cases that recognized aiding-and-abetting liability); see also Jill E. 
Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation:  In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary 
Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1999) (criticizing the Court’s lack of guid-
ance on what would merit the imposition of primary liability on secondary defen-
dants); Robert A. Prentice, Locating that “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Be-
tween Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 710-11 
(1997) (listing strong criticisms of Central Bank’s reasoning). 
20 Some early decisions thus refer to reliance as transaction causation.  See Schlick v. 
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]o show transaction cau-
sation a plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the misrepresentation[] .  .  .  .”). 
21 See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(refusing to hold underwriters liable for misleading statements because they reasona-
bly did not know the statements were untrue). 
22 See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] 
secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a statement not attri-
buted to that actor at the time of its dissemination.”); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 
720-21 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an accounting firm was not liable for failing to dis-
close material information when it was not under a duty to do so); see also Ziemba v. 
Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he alleged misstatement 
or omission . . . must have been publicly attributable to the defendant at the time that 
the plaintiff’s investment decision was made.”).  The law in the Second Circuit was 
muddied by a number of cases that suggested some softening, but not abandonment, 
of the attribution rule.  See In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 75-76 (2d Cir. 
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hind-the-scenes actors, no matter how important their roles, was justi-
fied in large part by reference to the reliance dicta in Central Bank.  
That is, these courts could not see how there could ever be reliance on 
an unknown actor’s private words or conduct.  But this reference to re-
liance was simply justification; instead of addressing reliance as a sepa-
rate element, courts were addressing the larger question of what consti-
tutes deceptive conduct within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. 
Because of the growing judicial conservatism on this particular 
question as more courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead, plaintiffs 
quickly shifted their emphasis away from claims of misrepresentations 
for which third-party defendants were responsible under Rule 10b-
5(b) to broader allegations that the third party’s actions were part of a 
“scheme to defraud,” for which they should bear coconspirator-like 
responsibility under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c).23  With this strategy, 
plaintiffs had a notable (but temporary) district court victory in the 
massive Enron litigation,24 and some favorable language (though not a 
favorable result) from the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner 
2001) (holding that a vice president could be liable for his company’s misstatements, 
even when they were not attributable to him, because he was primarily responsible for 
the company’s communications with investors and the drafting of misleading state-
ments); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (requiring 
that plaintiffs show what effect the allegedly fraudulent acts had on the market for the 
securities in question, without requiring plaintiffs to show specific reliance); In re 
Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (permitting 
claims against an auditor primarily responsible for false statements to survive a motion 
to dismiss after finding that “[a] strict requirement of public attribution would allow 
those primarily responsible for making false statements to avoid liability by remaining 
anonymous”).  In a subsequent case on the subject, the Second Circuit was again fairly 
restrictive.  In Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), the 
court reasoned that “[p]ublic understanding that an accountant is at work behind the 
scenes does not create an exception to the requirement that an actionable misstatement 
be made by the accountant.”  Underscoring its rigid attribution requirement, the court 
stated that “[u]nless the public’s understanding is based on the accountant’s articulated 
statement, the source for that understanding—whether it be a regulation, an account-
ing practice, or something else—does not matter.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  The 
Second Circuit’s return to a strict insistence on attribution was made clear most recently 
in Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown, No. 09-1619, 2010 WL 1659230 
(2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2010), discussed infra in notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
23 See Prentice, supra note 6, at 353 (discussing plaintiffs’ shift toward the use of 
Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) after Central Bank). 
24 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 706-
07 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (adopting a “scheme”-based approach that allows prosecution for 
aiding and abetting as a primary violation of section 10(b)). 
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Inc.25  But there were major losses as well.  The Fifth Circuit later over-
turned the district court ruling in the Enron litigation,26 borrowing ex-
tensively from the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in In re Charter 
Communications, Inc.—the Stoneridge case.27 
I am not inclined to linger over the Court’s choice in Stoneridge to 
make reliance the determinative issue in assessing scheme liability, 
even though, like the dissenters, I find it strange.  The standard fraud-
on-the-market theory presumes that investors rely on price integrity, 
not directly on the misinformation itself.28  The “but for” causal con-
nection between defendants’ acts and the price distortion was cogent 
and well pleaded.  In essence, plaintiffs were arguing that the third-
party defendants directly misled Charter’s auditor, which in turn led 
the auditor to certify Charter’s false financials and, thus, the resultant 
price distortion.  Had the auditors not been fooled, plaintiffs said, it is 
unlikely that Charter’s scheme would have succeeded.29  This is a clas-
sic claim of indirect reliance, well known in both tort and securities 
law.  By situating its restrictive approach in the element of reliance, 
the Court conveniently limited its holding to private securities litiga-
tion.  This arguably leaves the SEC and criminal prosecutors free to 
make more aggressive claims against third parties.30  The fact that this 
distinction was strongly urged by the Solicitor General in the govern-
ment’s amicus brief31—which the Court followed fairly faithfully in 
Stoneridge—is circumstantial evidence of a motivation to strike only at 
private securities litigation.  If so, then the awkwardness of basing this 
25 See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he scope of [section] 10(b) includes deceptive conduct in furtherance of a 
‘scheme to defraud.’”). 
26 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court’s interpretation of sec-
tion 10(b) was too broad). 
27 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (re-
jecting broad use of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) and narrowing the definition of “deceptive”), 
aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).  
The case was restyled as Stoneridge when the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
28 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (explaining that the 
fraud-on-the-market theory is premised on the idea that market prices adjust to reflect 
all available information, and thus fraudulent information distorts prices and affects all 
investors) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
29 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160 (explaining plaintiffs’ arguments). 
30 But see infra note 143 and accompanying text (describing a post-Stoneridge case in 
which the alleged executive behavior was insufficient to find primary liability).  
31 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18, 
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148 (No. 06-0043) [hereinafter Brief for the United States] (distin-
guishing the requirements of private actions from criminal prosecutions). 
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distinction on reliance is relatively harmless:  private plaintiffs are 
probably in no worse position than if the Court had ruled directly on 
the issue of what constitutes deceptive conduct, while public enforcers 
(and their investor beneficiaries) are arguably better off. 
The Court did not explain its statement that the chain between 
defendants’ acts and plaintiffs’ reliance was “too remote,”32 except in 
making two related points.  One, stressed repeatedly, is that Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola were dealing with Charter in “the realm of or-
dinary business operations” (i.e., that of purchase and supply con-
tracts, advertising, etc.), as opposed to the realm of finance, which 
touches on the securities markets and hence is of special federal con-
cern.33  At first glance, this argument seems almost inane.  Accounting 
and financial reports are nothing more than the quantitative expres-
sion of the results of business operations, ordinary and extraordinary.  
As the Court later acknowledges, what Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
allegedly did was proscribed by federal law as criminal and civil aiding 
and abetting.  In fact, managers at both companies were penalized by 
the SEC for exactly the same kinds of dealings with Adelphia, another 
cable television issuer caught up in an even larger financial reporting 
scandal.34  The federal interest here seems especially compelling be-
cause the third parties’ deception seemed to be directed at Charter’s 
auditors,35 and independent auditors play a central, congressionally 
mandated role in the federal regime designed to promote corporate 
transparency and stock price integrity.  Here, like an overzealous ad-
vocate getting carried away with his argument, Justice Kennedy seems 
32 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
33 Id. at 161; see also id. at 166 (noting that Charter’s relationship with defendants 
“took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere”). 
34 See In re Motorola, Exchange Act Release No. 55,725, [2007 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,908, at 84,809 (May 8, 2007) (instituting a cease-and-
desist order against Motorola for participating in a “round-trip of cash” with Adelphia 
and helping Adelphia falsify its earnings); In re Eidson, Exchange Act Release No. 
54,031, 88 SEC Docket 782 (June 22, 2006) (establishing a cease-and-desist order 
against Scientific-Atlanta’s senior vice president of finance and operations for approv-
ing Adelphia’s behavior); In re Haislip, Exchange Act Release No. 54,030, 88 SEC 
Docket 779 (June 22, 2006) (imposing a cease-and-desist order against Scientific-
Atlanta’s principal accounting officer for approving misreporting done by Adelphia). 
35 In their complaint, plaintiffs raised the possibility that the auditors were com-
plicit in the fraud; in fact, Arthur Andersen settled early on.  One possible interpreta-
tion of the facts is that Andersen wanted fabricated documentation simply so it could 
feign ignorance of the fraud and thereby escape an obligation to blow the whistle.  
Were this so, the case for primary liability would be much weaker.  On appeal, howev-
er, all parties assumed that the deceptive conduct was intended to mislead Andersen. 
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too quick to seize on a federalism argument.  But I think more sense 
can be made of the distinction, and so I will return to it shortly. 
The Court’s other justification, also puzzling at first glance, is that 
nothing the secondary defendants did “made it necessary or inevitable 
for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”36  This could be read 
to narrow the scope of third-party liability to almost nothing, because 
very few contributory acts ever make a fraud necessary or inevitable.37  
The Solicitor General’s brief, from which this idea derives, was more 
nuanced, claiming in essence that the defendants’ sham contracts and 
falsified documents merely set the stage for Charter to more easily 
dupe its accountants and, consequently, its investors, but that almost 
all of the active deception was by Charter.38  In this light, the point is 
more consistent with, and not substantially different from, the Court’s 
repeated emphasis on remoteness and attenuation. 
For our purposes, it is crucial to note how open-ended and inde-
terminate the Court’s remoteness standard is, which should not make 
it particularly restrictive for lower courts.  As noted earlier, some courts 
had developed much stricter approaches to what constitutes deceptive 
conduct prior to Stoneridge—most notably the “bright-line” attribution 
test39—that the Court could easily have endorsed in the context of the 
facts before it.  Many amicus briefs supporting the defendants, 
representing nearly all portions of the business community and drafted 
by the elite of the Supreme Court bar, were not shy about offering strin-
gent standards that would all but eliminate third-party liability. 
That the Court did not follow these pleas is well worth pondering, 
and takes us to the crucial question:  should we read Stoneridge’s con-
clusion about attenuation simply as a reason the reliance claim failed, 
or is it the reason?  If the latter, what does this imply about the scope 
of third-party liability under Rule 10b-5 more generally?  The Court’s 
tradition of holdings narrowly tailored to the facts before it favors the 
former reading.  The Solicitor General’s office had strongly urged re-
straint, telling the Court that it was unnecessary to reach any further 
questions, like the propriety of the attribution test, when third-party 
36 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161. 
37 One example where this might be an apt characterization would be where a 
participant deceives not only the company’s auditors but other senior managers as 
well, duping them into repeating the lie in the company’s filings. 
38 See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 20-21 (“The critical point is that 
it was Charter’s misrepresentation of its cash flow, not respondents’ conduct, on which 
petitioner allegedly relied.”). 
39 See infra Section IV.A (discussing the pre-Stoneridge attribution test). 
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liability is justified40—an equivocation that quite possibly was the result 
of the office’s own private negotiations with the SEC, which had long 
pushed for a more expansive approach to primary liability in its own 
enforcement and amicus briefs. 
On the other hand, since there were so many available tests, both 
for reliance as well as for other elements underlying scheme liability, 
it seems fair to assume that the Court chose deliberately to use re-
moteness and attenuation as the best way to think about reliance.  At 
one point, the Court posed the inquiry specifically in terms of whether 
the third party’s acts “were immediate or remote to the injury,”41 sug-
gesting that it was putting forth a test.  So, without suggesting that it is 
the only plausible reading of the Court’s opinion, I want to make the 
following assumption and then see what follows from its natural im-
plication:  that there may be a significant category of cases where 
third-party involvement is not too remote or attenuated from plain-
tiff’s reliance.  If so, thinking about what kinds of third-party involve-
ment might be immediate rather than remote is necessary, which in 
turn requires thinking about what differentiating between the two ac-
complishes.  As discussed more fully below, I posit that the Court’s test 
is a way of limiting third-party liability to those cases in which the de-
fendant fairly deserves the extraordinary form of liability that fraud-
on-the-market lawsuits threaten.  The more remote from the fraud the 
defendant’s conduct is, the less likely it is that this potential liability is 
either fair or efficient; the more immediate it becomes, the more like-
ly that primary liability would be the defendant’s just deserts.  The 
judge can decide this as a matter of law, thereby dismissing defendants 
early on when appropriate.  The Court offers a sliding-scale test aimed 
at creating rough proportionality between the conduct and the ex-
traordinary risk of liability these lawsuits generate. 
Later, I shall explore how such a reading of Stoneridge applies to 
particular factual circumstances that have arisen in recent cases.  But 
first, an important definitional point:  it is tempting to see the Court’s 
actions as substituting proximate cause for but-for causation in the re-
liance inquiry.  However, the standard approach to proximate cause is 
famously one of foreseeability.  The plaintiffs were probably right to 
argue to the Court that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were aware 
(or at least that a reasonable person in their position would have been 
40 See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22 n.12 (“[M]isstatements made 
by a secondary actor must be publicly attributed to the secondary actor before liability 
can attach in a private action.”). 
41 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160. 
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aware) that Charter was going to use the sham contracts and falsified 
documents to produce false accounting results, thereby satisfying a fo-
reseeability standard.  The Court responded to this by explicitly reject-
ing such a standard, stating that “[w]ere this concept of reliance to be 
adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole market-
place in which the issuing company does business; and there is no au-
thority for this rule.”42  This refers back to the world-of-commerce/ 
world-of-finance distinction. 
If proximate cause does not aptly describe the kind of analysis at 
work, what does?  Two possibilities come closer.  One is standing, 
which addresses whether the victim’s claimed injury would justify a 
claim against the defendant in question.43  A better way of describing 
the analysis, however, is in terms of duty.  The Court appears to be say-
ing that only certain kinds of actors and conduct ought to be sub-
jected to the extraordinary risk of a fraud-on-the-market lawsuit—i.e., 
that the enforceable duty of candor owed specifically to all investors in 
the capital marketplace should be limited and should not attach to 
“the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does business” 
unless the actors can fairly be said to owe a cognizable duty to the 
marketplace.44  Here, the Court’s otherwise incoherent articulation of 
a difference between the realms of business and finance makes more 
sense:  maybe the duty should largely be limited to those who inhabit 
the realm of finance and hence are on notice of the extraordinary le-
gal risks and responsibilities that the federal securities laws create.  
The sliding scale of attenuation and remoteness might capture this 
fairly well.  Part III will explain this notion more fully. 
However, we first need to examine and clarify more carefully the 
supposed need for proportionality.  In tort-reform debates, claims of 
disproportionate liability and limited duty can easily mask probusiness 
protectionism.  If the recovery in fraud-on-the-market cases is nothing 
more than the sum of all the victims’ real damages, we should be 
more worried about making the injured investors whole than protect-
ing the pocketbooks of third-party actors who engaged in deceptive, 
42 Id. at 160. 
43 I am grateful to Gerry Spann for suggesting standing as a possibility.  Another 
possibility is the “in connection with” requirement, see infra Section III.A, but this 
would apply to SEC actions as well. 
44 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160. 
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illegal misconduct.45  Proximate cause and duty are workhorses in tort 
law, but mostly in the law of negligence.  Rule 10b-5 requires a show-
ing of intent and, hence, culpability.  The next Part will show why dis-
proportionality is a troublesome problem in private securities litiga-
tion that warrants a measured response. 
II.  THE PROPORTIONALITY PROBLEM 
A.  Remedial Overbreadth 
The standard measure of damages in securities class actions under 
Rule 10b-5 is the modified out-of-pocket measure.46  In essence, this 
awards to each person who traded during the class period the differ-
ence between the transaction price and the hypothetical fair value of 
the security at the time of the transaction.  This measure is meant to 
be purely compensatory—punitive damages have no place under the 
Securities Exchange Act.47  When there are multiple defendants, the 
starting point for calculating damages is that each defendant found 
guilty of fraud is jointly and severally liable for all the losses her decep-
tion proximately caused.48  We should note, however, that one of the 
plaintiffs’ bar’s aims in pursuing scheme liability was to hold each par-
ticipant in the scheme responsible for all investor damages flowing 
from the overall fraud, whether or not directly connected to the par-
ticipant’s own deceptions.49  If Stoneridge had applied such an ap-
proach, Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta would have been liable for 
damages far beyond the effects of their own transactions, which were 
only a piece of Charter’s fraud. 
45 See James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) (examining the current “scope of liability for collater-
al participants” under section 10(b)). 
46 See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 717 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that, although courts 
are amenable to using any appropriate measure of damages, the common standard in 
Rule 10b-5 cases is the tort-based out-of-pocket measure). 
47 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (limit-
ing recovery to “actual damages”). 
48 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f), which is 
discussed infra in notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
49 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 
722-23 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (determining that a plaintiff can pursue a claim for joint and 
several liability against defendants who are “primary violators in the scheme, as a 
whole”).  This is not a necessary conclusion, however, and a court could reasonably 
hold that third-party defendants are responsible only for damages flowing directly 
from their own deceptions (e.g., by reference to doctrines of loss causation). 
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The aggregate of such per-trade recoveries can be staggeringly 
large, usually far in excess of any benefit the defendants hoped to gain 
from the misrepresentations or concealment.  Multibillion-dollar cases 
are not infrequent, and hundred-million-dollar cases are ordinary.  
That is not, by itself, problematic if those recoveries closely approx-
imate actual investor injuries.  However, my sense is that they do not, 
and that the prevailing approach overcompensates fairly significantly, 
albeit for understandable reasons. 
The first reason is doctrinal and connects Stoneridge back to Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson,50 the Court’s seminal decision on reliance in open-
market fraud litigation.  Basic insists that reliance is a crucial element 
of the plaintiff’s cause of action, but it creates a presumption of re-
liance in most cases involving widely traded securities, thereby facili-
tating class certification.51  While Basic describes this as a rebuttable 
presumption, it is well recognized that defendants have no practical 
ability to rebut on an investor-by-investor basis—and make no effort to 
do so—once the court has determined that the alleged fraud did, in 
fact, distort the stock price.52  That brings us to what we mean by re-
liance, and here, Basic is confusing.  If the presumption of reliance is 
based on the assumption that investors relied by assuming that the 
prevailing market price was accurate (and thus simply free rode on it), 
large numbers of investors with actively managed portfolios would not 
qualify and do not deserve compensation.  The failure to exclude 
these from the recovery class implies substantial overcompensation. 
50 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
51 For elaboration on the points made here, see Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at 
Twenty:  Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 158-62 [hereinafter Lan-
gevoort, Basic at Twenty], which justifies Basic’s presumption of reliance as an assertion 
by the Court that investors have a right to rely on stock-price integrity.  See also Donald 
C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:  Market Efficiency Revisited, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 892-93 (1992) [hereinafter Langevoort, Theories] (describing 
the “practical consequences and . . . conceptual underpinnings of the fraud-on-the-
market theory” as applied in Basic). 
52 Basic allows rebuttal if the defendants can show that the decision to buy or sell 
was disconnected from the allegedly fraudulent market price.  See 485 U.S. at 248-49 
(“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the 
price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, 
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”).  For example, indexed mutual 
funds and pension funds commonly participate in recoveries even though they pur-
chase and sell automatically, without regard to price, following an algorithm designed 
simply to keep the portfolio in balance with the index.  Nevertheless, it is easy for inves-
tors to claim that they relied in some way or another, and an evidentiary hearing for 
thousands of investors would be extraordinarily costly and probably fruitless. 
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If the presumption is instead based on the assumption that inves-
tors simply considered the prevailing market price to be honest (i.e., 
not the product of fraud), the problem of overbreadth within the class 
diminishes.  But this comes only by abandoning reliance as a mea-
ningful element.  Fraud distorts prices with some frequency, and no 
reasonable investor would ever assume otherwise by relying blindly on 
price integrity.  Efficient markets price the risk of asymmetric infor-
mation; they do not assume its absence.  To the extent that we con-
tinue to insist on reliance—an insistence that Stoneridge repeats53—
overcompensation comes from allowing recovery as a result of the 
practical impediments that effectively make the presumption conclu-
sive by those who simply would not be able to demonstrate justifiable 
reliance on the fraud if put to the task. 
There is a way out, which Justice Brennan unsuccessfully tried to 
urge on Justice Blackmun in private correspondence while the latter 
was writing the Basic opinion:54  abandon the insistence on reliance al-
together (i.e., make the presumption conclusive) and substitute a cau-
sation inquiry to find injury, asking simply whether the investor pur-
chased or sold at a distorted price.  This would effectively create an 
entitlement to reliance on price integrity, conferred as a matter of ju-
ristic grace.  This is not an unreasonable position as a policy matter,55 
and it is probably the only plausible explanation for how current law 
actually operates, notwithstanding the Court’s repeated insistence 
otherwise.  But note that this move jettisons reliance as it is conven-
tionally understood in the law of fraud, which means that we can no 
longer say that the damages imposed in fraud-on-the-market cases 
simply compensate for detrimental reliance.56  For many class mem-
53 See 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s 
deceptive acts is an essential element of the [section] 10(b) private cause of action.”). 
54 See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 51, at 153 n.9 (describing attempts by 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun to satisfy their concerns without losing others’ votes).  
Justice Brennan ultimately gave up this effort after noting that their disagreement was 
probably trivial precisely because defendants had no practical ability to rebut.  See id. at 
162 nn.45 & 47.  Adam Pritchard uncovered this correspondence.  See Pritchard, supra 
note 5, at 221 n.16 (citing correspondence between the Justices). 
55 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regu-
lation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 766-81 (2006) (arguing for the viability of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption).  Early law and economics commentary explicitly rejected a role for 
reliance in fraud-on-the-market cases.  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance 
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (1983) 
(“The concept of a presumption of reliance . . . is best abandoned.”). 
56 For a thoughtful discussion of what makes reliance an essential element in fraud 
cases, see John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of 
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001 (2006).  The authors discuss the fraud-on-the-
2010] Reading Stoneridge Carefully 2141 
bers, what is described as injury is merely the deprivation of a judicial-
ly created entitlement.  Given the de facto substitution of causation 
for reliance, it is perfectly fair for courts to ask whether liability is pro-
portionate to the nature of the wrong. 
A second reason to worry about disproportion has to do with prov-
ing injury.  Arriving at the aggregate damage amount is an extremely 
complicated econometric task, on which plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
expert witnesses inevitably disagree.  The potential for erroneous com-
putation by a judge or jury is thus considerable, though it is not clear 
that the mere potential for error necessarily threatens defendants 
more than plaintiffs.  But there is a steadily growing belief among fi-
nancial economists that markets can both over- and underreact to 
news (as well as respond to pseudonews),57 so that faith in the preci-
sion of the measurement process weakens.  Congress was concerned 
enough about this that it addressed the issue in the PSLRA in 1995, 
but not in a very sophisticated way.58  To the extent that the econome-
tric tools have less power than we would like in a noisy marketplace, 
the risk of biased measurement of damages goes up.  True, there can 
be both under- and overreaction.  But because plaintiffs choose which 
lawsuits to bring based on the amount of damages that might be reco-
verable, the sample brought to court will naturally favor those where 
there may have been an overreaction. 
A third—and perhaps the most familiar—reason for concern, in-
itially explored in depth by Frank Easterbook and Daniel Fischel, is that 
market theory and argue that Basic preserves the special role for a reliance require-
ment because of the rebuttability of the presumption.  Id. at 1018-19.  I suggest that the 
norm is instead de facto irrebuttability—and hence simple causation—which changes 
the analysis substantially. 
57 See, e.g., Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 533-35 
(2003) (arguing that although analysts assume that “smart” investors know how to ad-
just incorrect pricing when they see it, there is no evidence to explain how investors 
identify incorrect prices); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market 
Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 509-10 (2006) (describing the phe-
nomenon of market overreaction to non-news); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy 
Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 139-41 (2006) (analyzing the layered effects of 
misinformation and heuristic errors on investor behavior); see also Langevoort, Theories, 
supra note 51, at 872 (juxtaposing regulators’ view of the efficient market with that of 
investors “overreacting to the most recent or most vivid news”). 
58 See, e.g., Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 
894-95 (1998) (describing PSLRA’s limit of damages in fraud-on-the-market cases as a 
means of controlling descriptive efficiency); see also Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity 
and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177, 1200 
(1996) (“[The PSLRA’s damages cap] adds confusion when its drafters sought certain-
ty.  It adds complexity when they sought simplicity.”). 
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fraud produces a mix of losses and gains for investors:  for every unfor-
tunate buyer there is a lucky seller, and vice versa.59  So the net harm to 
investors as a class approaches zero, with the difference being those 
trades by insiders complicit in the fraud.  This difference is usually just 
a small portion of the aggregate trading.  Although compensating for 
losses while ignoring all gains might not seem particularly troubling in 
any single case (except with respect to particular plaintiffs who traded 
actively during the class period and gained more than they lost),60 over 
time the combination of fortuitous trading gains and compensated 
losses will put many investors in a better position than they would be in 
a world with no fraud at all.  This suggests systematic overcompensa-
tion for many institutional and other active plaintiff-investors—at least, 
over a lifetime of trading.61  And institutional plaintiffs are the primary 
beneficiaries of the contemporary class-action system.62 
59 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 638-39 (1985) (pointing out that when public corporations is-
sue new, falsely priced stock, prior investors sell at a profit while buyers ultimately 
lose).  An important addition to the net-market-effect literature is Paul G. Mahoney, 
Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992).  
Mahoney notes that Easterbrook and Fischel fail to address the issue of social cost:  if 
issuers are forced to pay damages that fall below their net gains, there will be deter-
rence from the fraudulent activity.  Id. at 629-30.  
60 For a discussion of cases dealing with this particular issue, see Samuel Francis, 
Note, Meet Two-Face:  The Dualistic Rule 10b-5 and the Quandary of Offsetting Losses by 
Gains, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3045 (2009).  Francis analyzes the various issues that have 
arisen before courts when members of the class purchase and sell multiple times 
throughout the relevant period, and when some class members benefit while others 
lose.  Id. at 3061-64. 
61 See ANJAN THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, THE ECONOMIC 
REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS LITIGATION 14 (2005) (establishing that as 
many as forty percent of large institutional investors included in the analysis were over-
compensated in securities class actions).  This overcompensation is the starting point 
for analyzing a separate problem:  the so-called “circularity” in fraud-on-the-market 
cases.  Circularity arises because either the issuer itself or its director-and-officer insur-
er fund most settlements and judgments, both of which operate as charges, not directly 
to the corporate actors who engineered the fraud but rather to the issuer and (thus) 
its shareholders.  The result is that compensation has a pocket-shifting character—i.e., 
it operates as a form of investor insurance—with high transaction costs.  There is con-
troversy in the literature about whether this is truly problematic or not.  See Alicia Davis 
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 283 (2007) (proposing a 
compensation fund that would achieve “the promise of superior deterrence because its 
fraud risk-rating mechanism, unlike securities litigation, subjects all corporations to 
sanction”); Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues, 2009 WIS. 
L. REV. 455, 457-58 (criticizing believers of the circularity hypothesis, who argue for 
denying many investors recovery, as engaging in “academic activism” that contradicts 
congressional intent); cf. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securi-
ties Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 335-36 (contending that compensation is not 
problematic because it helps enforce mandatory disclosure obligations).  By and large, 
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A fourth and final reason for concern deserves more attention than 
it has received.  Recall that the computation of aggregate damages 
proceeds by measuring the difference for each trade by reference to the 
transaction price (which is known) and a hypothetical “fair” price.63  
The near universal assumption in the case law is that the fair price is the 
price at which the securities would have traded had the truth about the 
issuer been told.64  But for many reasons, some of which are discussed 
more fully below, that may not be the right counterfactual.65  If the 
more likely alternative to a defendant’s misrepresentation would have 
been to say nothing at all, or to engage in lawful “puffery” rather than 
tell the truth,66 then damages based on the standard assumption over-
compensate.  For instance, take a case in which, immediately after a mi-
srepresentation, the price per share is $21 and the plaintiff buys at that 
critics of the circularity argument quite correctly point out that many investors will be 
net losers, even over a lifetime, and thus deserve compensation.  But that criticism 
would not counter the systemic overcompensation argument if the result of the system 
is that money is paid without regard to whether a person is actually overcompen-
sated—i.e., to undeserving as well as deserving class members. 
62 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:  
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate 
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005) (“In 2004, securi-
ties fraud class action settlements produced $5.45 billion in cash to be distributed to 
defrauded investors.  Institutional investors own the lion’s share of the publicly traded 
equity securities in this country and therefore were entitled to collect most of that 
money . . . .”).  The implication of the critique of compensation in securities class ac-
tions is not to abandon these actions but rather to focus more clearly on deterrence as 
the proper way of structuring a remedy.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Dam-
ages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 642-43 (1996) (arguing that 
the current pocket-shifting scheme of compensation should be replaced by an optimal-
deterrence-oriented litigation framework); Rose, supra note 10, at 1352 (arguing for an 
oversight approach to eliminate current problems with the compensatory scheme). 
63 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
64 See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
damages are usually based on what the stock would have been worth “had all the in-
formation been disclosed” (citation omitted)); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. 
Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (D.N.J. 2005) (observing that the “true value” of the 
shares would be based on the value after the fraud has been disclosed to the public). 
65 See Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What?  Econometric Evidence and the Counter-
factual Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183, 185 (2009) (“[W]e simply cannot say that the coun-
terfactual to an alleged misrepresentation is necessarily the revelation of the truth.  If 
there was no duty to disclose and silence was a realistic option, then that actually may be 
the more likely counterfactual ‘no fraud’ state of the world.”).  For a discussion of the 
counterfactual problem generally, see Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual 
Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199. 
66 See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 46, at 606-09 (critiquing the 
proposition expressed in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997), 
which stated that that vague but positive statements by an issuer are not material to 
investor behavior). 
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price.  Assume that, had the truth been told, the price would have been 
$15, as it is later once the truth is revealed.  That suggests a compensa-
ble loss of $6, which is what nearly all courts would award.  But now fur-
ther assume that the defendant had no duty to speak at all,67 and could 
have chosen to say nothing or to speak in optimistic terms too vague to 
be actionable.  Had the defendant taken this course, the price would 
probably still have been at (or close to) $21 and the plaintiff would have 
a right to little or no compensation.  If the latter is the more likely 
counterfactual—i.e., the plaintiff would have suffered almost exactly the 
same investment loss in the absence of a violation as it did in the pres-
ence of the one that occurred—then awarding $6 per share is signifi-
cant overcompensation.  While choosing the more likely counterfactual 
between truth telling and lawful concealment is often difficult, simply 
presuming that the truth would always have been revealed—and me-
chanically calculating damages based on that presumption—introduces 
another overcompensatory bias into the law. 
The point of the foregoing analysis is not to criticize those courts 
that have created a nearly irrebutable presumption of reliance, assumed 
market efficiency, ignored fraud-based gains, or used truth telling as the 
standard counterfactual.  There are good pragmatic reasons for each of 
those choices.  The crucial point, instead, is that as a cumulative result of 
these and other doctrinal moves, the fraud-on-the-market theory be-
comes an extraordinary remedy that does far more than just make fraud 
victims whole.  Once we see the remedy as extraordinary, there is ample 
justification for the courts that created this remedy to worry about 
whether particular defendants really deserve to face it. 
B.  Culpability and Securities Fraud 
Securities fraud can be—and often is—venal and corrupt, even 
sociopathic.  In this Section, however, I want to show that there is also 
a significant portion of securities fraud to which we might attach 
much less (perhaps even no) blameworthiness.  It is this portion that, 
when measured against the extraordinary liability regime just dis-
cussed, amplifies the concern about disproportion. 
67 The duty to speak is a fairly circumscribed category, at least beyond those dis-
closures mandated by the SEC.  See id. at 685-96 (showing that mere possession of in-
formation does not create a duty to disclose, but prohibits the use of “half-truths” 
when one affirmatively speaks, and noting that some courts uphold a duty to update, 
while all courts uphold a duty to correct when misinformation is discovered). 
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Soon after Rule 10b-5 doctrine abandoned the privity requirement 
in the late 1960s,68 thereby creating risks of vast liability from false dis-
closure and publicity, courts seemed to realize that more restraint in 
the Rule’s application was needed.  One of the first moves in this direc-
tion—resolving a decade of confusion in the lower courts—was the Su-
preme Court’s holding that liability under Rule 10b-5 required a show-
ing of scienter,69 which means that only intentional or subjectively reck-
reckless conduct is proscribed.  At first glance, this would seem to elim-
inate much of the reason for doubt.  Because Rule 10b-5 reaches only 
intentional fraud, rational actors have the ability to refrain from activity 
that would cause harm.70  This brings us back to the point, noted earli-
er, that tort law tends to apply more restrictive rules of reliance and 
causation for negligence, but not with respect to intentional harms.71 
In two respects, however, this confidence is misplaced.  The first—
a lively subject in the scholarly literature in the early 1990s—is that 
some forms of misrepresentation and omission involve mildly tragic 
choices where the speaker realizes that telling the truth will severely 
harm some legitimate interest (e.g., the company and its shareholders), 
while lying will harm a certain class of traders.  The common example is 
the desire to protect a trade secret or a promising merger negotiation.72  
To be sure, a reasonable response is to choose the less harmful course 
but be prepared to compensate the traders if lying is the utilitarian 
choice.  But this gives all the more reason to make sure that the com-
pensatory amount is limited to what is absolutely necessary.  As the pre-
vious Section shows, there are grounds for concern about that.73  For 
instance, is it necessarily desirable to compensate a trader who would 
not be able to show actual reliance on the fraud (but who gains the pre-
sumption of reliance after Basic) in the case of a misrepresentation or 
omission that can be justified on utilitarian grounds? 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
69 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (holding that 
scienter is a required element of Rule 10b-5 because of the language of section 10(b) 
and the legislative history behind the Rule’s adoption). 
70 Easterbrook and Fischel discuss this point in their explanation of legal rules that 
could achieve proper deterrence.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 621-23. 
71 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
72 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:  Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 949 (1991) (acknowledging that it is sometimes in the sharehold-
ers’ best interest for “managers to lie to the market”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics:  An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1091 (1990) (arguing that “strategic misrepresentations” should be 
permitted when made “in furtherance of [a] fiduciary duty to shareholders”). 
73 See supra Section II.A (discussing proportionality problems in Rule 10b-5 liability).   
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Intentionality is a much more significantly incomplete response 
with regards to vicarious liability.  Especially in the area of third-party 
liability, almost all claims of responsibility are directed at entities, not 
individuals:  law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, and so on.74  
The doctrine of corporate scienter, although admittedly fuzzy around 
the margins, attributes intent or recklessness fairly readily from agent to 
principal.75  As a result, corporate entities, and therefore their share-
holders, bear most of the securities-fraud liability, not the individual 
agents who committed the wrongful acts.  In some cases, there may not 
be any specific agent who acted wrongfully but simply collective 
“wrongdoing” based on the conduct and knowledge of multiple agents. 
In such cases, blameworthiness is muted, and often nonexistent.76  
Of course, there may be an economics-based argument for vicarious lia-
bility to force the internalization of costs and induce optimal precau-
tions, though as Paul Mahoney, Jennifer Arlen, and William Carney 
showed in two seminal scholarly works appearing at roughly the same 
time, this argument is complicated and far from compelling.77  This issue 
does not need to be addressed, although the disappearance of blame-
worthiness from vicarious liability (except in situations where there is an 
inexcusable monitoring failure at the entity level) should be noted.  
Thus, the argument can be made, but it is not easy. 
There may be other reasons to worry about disproportion—
particularly based on the risk of judging in hindsight78—but further 
74 See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the claims in Stoneridge). 
75 See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority remain applicable to 
suits for securities fraud.”); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 
F.3d 353, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a corporation’s scienter can be in-
ferred from the scienter of its agents). 
76 But see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”:  An Essay on Compensation 
and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 294-95 (concluding 
that shareholders, particularly long-term, nontrading investors, should take responsibility 
to be better informed and more active in management oversight).  For a discussion of 
the connection between vicarious liability and scienter in organizational settings, see Do-
nald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 126-30 (1997). 
77 See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets:  Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693 (introducing the notion that 
corporate-liability theories may be incomplete because some agency costs are conven-
tionally ignored); Mahoney, supra note 59, at 624-25 (hypothesizing that abandoning 
fraud-on-the-market theory in favor of requiring “individualized proof of reliance” 
would produce optimal deterrence). 
78 See Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2004) (discussing hindsight bias in fraud litigation, 
where past mistakes could later be misinterpreted as intentional fraud).  This is espe-
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discussion would take us too far afield.  If we were sure that the fraud-
on-the-market remedy is simply (and efficiently) compensatory, this 
might not matter much; risk of error is endemic to all litigation.  
However, if the previous Section is correct, greater caution in assign-
ing liability is warranted. 
C.  Section 21D(f) 
Thus far, we have largely ignored a crucially important aspect of 
the problem.  Disproportion was a driving force behind the PSLRA, 
and that legislation is a comprehensive response to it, as well as other 
fears of litigation abuse.  Specifically, Congress added section 21D(f) 
to direct courts to implement a proportionate liability regime.79  One 
would think, then, that concerns about disproportionality should dis-
appear as a result. 
Unfortunately, 21D(f) is a mess of a statutory text.  It directs the 
factfinder to determine the percentage of liability that any given defen-
dant deserves measured against the aggregate fault of all persons 
claimed to have “caused or contributed to the loss”80—whether these 
persons are named as defendants or not, and perhaps without regard to 
whether they could be held liable at all.  Completely undefined is how 
the factfinder should construct the denominator:  precisely who might 
have caused or contributed?  However, the allocation process is not 
plaintiff-friendly,81 so this interpretive problem is not part of my analysis. 
What takes away much of the protection is the total exclusion 
from proportionate liability for those who “knowingly” violated the 
law, defined with respect to Rule 10b-5 as acting with actual know-
ledge of the falsity of a representation or omission when persons are 
cially true with respect to materiality; because lawsuits are only brought after high-
magnitude events (usually adverse ones), there is a risk of overestimating the probabil-
ity of occurrence that is hard to eliminate. 
79 For a discussion of the legislative history and many of the interpretive problems 
of the PSLRA, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liabil-
ity Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:  Proportionate Liability, Contribu-
tion Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157 (1996).  Section 21D(f) has received 
little judicial attention, presumably because most viable cases are settled prior to a jury 
decision on liability.  But see In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 236 
F.R.D. 313, 317 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting the court’s inability “to find any opinion by a 
court that has actually tried a case utilizing the [section 21D liability] provisions,” and 
setting out a plan for its application). 
80 See PSLRA § 21D(f)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(3) (2006).   
81 See Langevoort, supra note 79, at 1166-68 (explaining the ways in which courts 
allocate damages among responsible parties). 
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likely to reasonably rely on it.82  The apparent intent of the legislation 
was to distinguish between knowledge and recklessness, with only the 
latter form of scienter warranting protection. 
As previously noted,83 this treatment leaves much conduct that we 
would regard as relatively low- or no-culpability behavior unprotected, 
especially with respect to vicarious liability.  Though the question was 
not posed in Stoneridge because the case was still at the pleadings stage, 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola might well not have been protected 
because their agents allegedly knew that they were facilitating a fraud 
and that knowledge could then be attributed to the entity defendants 
under agency-law principles.84 
III.  TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF DUTY “WITHIN” RELIANCE 
As set forth earlier,85 the reading that I am giving Stoneridge is best 
described in terms of duty:  Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did not 
owe a duty of candor to marketplace buyers of Charter’s stock that is 
enforceable under Rule 10b-5 because their involvement was too re-
mote or attenuated from those purchases for there to be protectable 
reliance.86  To be sure, this form of duty analysis is jarring.  In con-
temporary Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, duty plays a relatively circum-
scribed role, limited primarily to addressing when someone commits 
fraud through silence or inaction—i.e., the affirmative duty to dis-
close.  Prevailing authority provides that persons automatically assume 
82  PSLRA § 21D(f)(10)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A). 
83 See supra Section II.A. 
84 The sales and marketing personnel apparently made the mid-level decision to aid 
Charter by engaging in the sham transactions:  there was no solid evidence that senior 
executive officers at either Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola had approved the scheme.  See 
Brian A. Ochs, Has the Securities and Exchange Commission Expanded Corporate Liability?, 38 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1549, 1557 (2006) (noting that the SEC did not allege that Scientif-
ic-Atlanta’s executives reviewed the transaction documents).  Undoubtedly, the motiva-
tion was to keep in place a profitable commercial relationship (Charter could have 
threatened the loss of business if one supplier failed to play along while the other did).  
All this easily supports attribution of knowledge as a matter of law to the defendant 
entities.  The best evidence of this comes from the SEC’s enforcement action involving 
Scientific-Atlanta, which focused not on its assistance of Charter but rather its similar 
sham transactions with Adelphia Communications.  The SEC brought (and settled) an 
action against Scientific-Atlanta’s chief financial officer, but without claiming that he had 
knowledge.  See In re Haislip, Exchange Act Release No. 54,030, 88 SEC Docket 779, at 
782  (June 22, 2006) (finding that Haislip was a “cause” of Adelphia’s violations); see 
also Ochs, supra, at 1556-57 (discussing the SEC’s action against Scientific-Atlanta). 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
86 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 
(2008) (holding that the indirect chain of reliance is “too remote for liability”). 
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an enforceable duty to speak truthfully whenever they either choose 
or are required by law to speak through a medium that is likely to in-
fluence investment decisions.87  Under my reading, however, duty 
takes on a completely different role.  In this Part, I will explore in 
some detail the doctrinal move that this interpretation implies. 
A.  The Road Not Taken:  The “In Connection With” Requirement 
Concern about disproportion in Rule 10b-5 class actions arose as 
soon as courts abandoned privity as a requirement for liability.88  Until 
then, private securities fraud litigation had arisen mainly in face-to-
face dealings, with fraud by a purchaser or seller of securities and with 
the victims as the counterparties in the transaction.  In SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit famously held that one need not 
be either a purchaser or a seller to violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.89  
Rather, the statutory and rule requirement that the fraud be “in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of [a] security” was satisfied when 
the victims were purchasers or sellers.90  The violator could be anyone 
who made a material misrepresentation or omission in a manner “rea-
sonably calculated to influence the investing public,”91 regardless of 
who, how, or why it was made.  Immediately, investors started filing 
class actions, claiming that the entire marketplace had been deceived 
by some kind of false publicity, and these suits soon became known as 
fraud-on-the-market cases.92 
Over time, the “in connection with” test has come to be inter-
preted fairly consistently as a proximate cause requirement;93 that is, 
87 See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 505-06 (3d Cir. 1988) (dis-
cussing “misrepresentations” that would serve to “deceive purchaser” of stock as satisfy-
ing the duty requirement, without any further proof of privity). 
88 See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round:  Privity and State of Mind 
in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 441 (1969) (positing that with 
the elimination of privity, “the defendant’s liability may far exceed the profit he made”). 
89 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 862. 
92 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42, 250 (1988) (holding that 
“[i]t is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-
on-the-market theory”). 
93 See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 46, at 661 (explaining that courts 
typically focus on the “link between defendants’ fraud and purchases or sales of securi-
ties by the victims” in their “in connection with” analysis).  It is interesting to note that 
in Basic, the dissenters (who but for the happenstance of vacancies and recusals could 
easily have been the majority) suggested that the right approach might be a rejection 
of Texas Gulf Sulphur and a reinstatement of a privity requirement, thereby destroying 
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the standard interpretation of “reasonably calculated” is in terms of 
foreseeability, not the speaker’s motivation.  So long as the speaker 
understands there to be a reasonable likelihood that the lie will influ-
ence investors’ decisions (or, after Basic, distort the stock price), liabil-
ity follows.  As we have seen, this is how plaintiffs sensibly argued Stone-
ridge:  the third-party defendants allegedly knew that the sham trans-
actions and underlying documentation would mislead Charter’s 
auditors, and in turn, be incorporated into false and misleading finan-
cial statements issued by Charter and certified by those accountants.  
This, the plaintiffs said, amply satisfied the proximate cause/reasonably 
foreseeable standard, and should therefore also satisfy the test for third-
party primary liability.  By rejecting this argument—albeit under the 
guise of the reliance requirement—the Court was restricting the stan-
dard proximate cause analysis.94  By referring to reliance, however, the 
Court explicitly left the “in connection with” law untouched, an out-
come that the government (particularly the SEC) no doubt wanted. 
We should pause to note that many of the advocates on the de-
fendants’ side wanted the Court to do otherwise.  One popular argu-
ment was to point to language in a number of the Court’s recent opi-
nions suggesting that the “in connection with” language is satisfied 
only when the fraud and the purchase or sale “coincide,”95 which, they 
said, would not be the case when behind-the-scenes deception occurs 
prior to the making of the public disclosure.  However, the dicta in 
question suggesting the need for strict coincidence came out of insid-
er-trading case law96 and was meant to justify an expansive interpreta-
tion of “in connection with” in the special situation where the fraud is 
not a communicative act but rather a simple breach of fiduciary duty.97  
the viability of the fraud-on-the-market lawsuit.  See Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra 
note 51, at 163 (noting that Justice White’s dissent “hint[ed] at a rejection of SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur”). 
94 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 
(2008) (holding that investors could not have been “said to have relied upon” the 
third parties’ actions). 
95 E.g., Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 9, Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148 (No. 06-0043) (arguing that “in connection 
with” can only be satisfied when the defendant’s acts, not an abstract “scheme,” coin-
cide with a purchase or sale). 
96 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (describing the “clas-
sical” theory of insider trading in relation to Rule 10b-5 violations). 
97 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the Supreme Court referred 
to the “coincide” locution in the context of a fraud-on-the-market claim.  547 U.S. 71, 
85 (2006).  However, a careful reading makes clear that the Court was simply explain-
ing the breadth of the “in connection with” requirement in the many contexts in 
which it has been applied—hardly suggesting anything in the way of a limitation.  See 
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Only the most formalistic and mindless reading would suggest that the 
same idea has any usefulness in fraud-on-the-market cases. 
On the other hand, the Court could well have substituted its re-
moteness/attenuation test in place of proximate cause had it wished 
to speak more expansively; indeed, that approach would have made 
more sense as a conceptual matter than using the test to address re-
liance.  So we might wonder what the consequence would be of so 
doing—besides simply making life harder for government enforce-
ment.  One pre-Stoneridge case, which otherwise is something of a doc-
trinal anomaly, offers an interesting clue.  In Ontario Public Service Em-
ployees Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel Networks Corp.,98 the Second 
Circuit confronted a case in which a class of purchasers sued Nortel 
for false financial reporting.  Notably, the plaintiffs were not purchas-
ers or sellers of Nortel stock; rather, they had bought shares in JDS 
Uniphase, relying on the falsely positive financial information about 
Nortel as a signal of JDS Uniphase’s good prospects, because it was 
Nortel’s largest supplier of fiber-optic components.99 
If this was treated as an “in connection with” case, the question 
would have been whether it was foreseeable that lies about Nortel 
could or would affect JDS Uniphase.  The answer would almost certain-
ly be “yes”—market efficiency works so that news affects not only the 
issuer’s stock price but also the prices of affiliated companies.  Howev-
er, the court dismissed the complaint on the curious ground that pur-
chasers of JDS Uniphase did not have “purchaser-seller” standing to 
sue Nortel.100  The reasoning is cryptic—since the plaintiffs were clearly 
purchasers—but the court seems to suggest that one must be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities of the company releasing the information. 
That result, however, makes little sense in terms of “in connection 
with” precedent:  there is nothing in Rule 10b-5 law limiting fraud lia-
bility to the issuer itself, and other Second Circuit cases plainly recog-
nize that there is no such limitation.101  But note how the result might 
SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (surveying contemporary 
“in connection with” approaches).  In other insider trading cases, courts have not been 
insistent on strict temporal coincidence.  See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 
230-31 (2d Cir. 2001) (insisting only on a reasonable nexus between the misappropria-
tion and the trading). 
98 369 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2004). 
99 See id. at 29 (observing that ten to fifteen percent of JDS Uniphase’s revenues 
came from Nortel).   
100 Id. at 32. 
101 E.g., In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding no case that limits fraud liability to the issuer).  In fact, the Second Circuit has 
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more easily be explained using the “duty within reliance”-type analysis 
found in Stoneridge.  The court could have said that the link between 
Nortel’s false financials and trading in JDS Uniphase was just too atte-
nuated.  Put another way, an issuer owes the duty of candor to its own 
purchasers and sellers (or those of merger partners or takeover tar-
gets102) but not to the investing world at large. 
B.  Rediscovering Duty 
Contemporary Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence uses duty mainly to de-
termine when silence is fraudulent—i.e., the duty to speak.  But earli-
er in its development, duty played a more pervasive role.  This was es-
pecially true in the earliest days of private securities litigation, before 
the courts had either imposed a scienter requirement or limited the 
scope of the affirmative disclosure obligation.103  Particularly notable 
here was the so-called “flexible duty” approach, a holistic inquiry that 
assessed liability based on (1) informational imbalance between the 
parties; (2) relative access to information; (3) who initiated the trans-
action; (4) benefit to the defendant; and (5) defendant’s awareness of 
the reliance on the misinformation.104  As the law gradually became 
more refined and restrictive on scienter and duty to disclose, the flex-
ible duty approach was rendered problematic and gradually fell into 
disuse—though echoes of it can still be found in modern case law.105 
As this doctrinal retrenchment occurred, the specific question of 
third-party liability for fraud turned into the law of aiding and abet-
explicitly disclaimed any such reading of Nortel.  See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 
503 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In short, the district court incorrectly read Nortel Net-
works to mean that an action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements about a security 
purchased by the plaintiff lies only against the issuer of the security . . . .”).   
102 See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 177 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We em-
phasize . . . that it is no defense that the alleged misrepresentations were made in the 
context of a tender offer and proposed merger . . . .”). 
103 See generally Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to 
Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979) (recognizing the broad scope of the duty to disclose 
applicable at the time). 
104 See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that Rule 
10b-5 “must be construed liberally and flexibly” to meet Congress’s intentions); see also 
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979) (referring to White v. Abrams’s 
“flexible duty standard” and summarizing relevant analysis factors from that opinion). 
105 See Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1330 n.26 (8th Cir. 1991) (li-
miting rejection of the “flexible duty” test to the scienter element of Rule 10b-5); see 
also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule  
10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1671-74 (2004) (discussing the confusion surrounding 
the “flexible duty” approach). 
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ting, where it thrived until Central Bank.106  At first glance, aiding-and-
abetting law was straightforward, asking simply whether the third-party 
defendant (1) substantially assisted the primary defendant in violating 
the law and (2) acted with the requisite scienter.  However, a closer 
look shows that duty played a substantial and explicit role in this in-
quiry.107  Courts regularly encountered situations in which the alleged 
assistance was fairly small, sometimes even nonexistent (i.e., a failure 
simply to blow the whistle on wrongdoing by the primary violator).  
The resulting doctrine was messy but generally took the position that 
if there was a duty (flexibly determined) running from the third party 
to the victims, then the intent standard would be applied broadly—
including recklessness—and the required assistance would not have to 
be all that great.  In the absence of duty, by contrast, the test would be 
more demanding, requiring actual knowledge and greater involve-
ment.108  Some courts even said that when there was no duty, second-
ary actors could not be held liable absent a showing of “high con-
scious intent,” meaning not only actual knowledge, but a specific 
desire to have the fraud succeed.109 
What was happening here, obviously, was an effort to restrict aid-
ing-and-abetting liability to situations where, in the courts’ view, the 
behavior warranted fraud-on-the-market liability—precisely what also 
motivated Stoneridge under my reading.  In other words, if a duty-based 
approach to third-party primary liability were to emerge, it would re-
connect contemporary doctrine to a body of law that asked similar 
questions in a broader context twenty years ago.  But for its truncation 
as a result of Central Bank, that body of law might well have evolved to 
make duty analysis central to Rule 10b-5 more generally. 
106 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 
(1994) (concluding that section 10(b) does not reach aiding and abetting).  
107 See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency:  Common-Law Principles and 
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 318-19 (1988) (describing secondary liability in 
terms of duty). 
108 See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the scien-
ter requirement “scales upward when [the] activity is more remote” (quoting Woodward 
v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975)); Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96 
(“This issue [of the extent of involvement required] turns on the nature of the duty 
owed by the alleged aider and abettor to the other parties to the transaction.”). 
109 See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1988) (find-
ing that the scienter requirement would be met if the “abettor acts from a desire to 
help the fraud succeed”); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 
496-97 (7th Cir. 1986) (insisting on a showing that defendant had “thrown in his lot” 
with the primary wrongdoer). 
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C.  Defining Duty for Purposes of Third-Party Liability 
A reinvigorated approach to duty within reliance essentially says 
that a person does not bear liability to one or more victims in a Rule 
10b-5 lawsuit unless that person owes a duty of honesty or candor to 
those victims.  How, then, might that duty arise?  A threshold question 
here is whether fraud-on-the-market cases differ from ones arising in 
face-to-face settings.  Because the approaches to reliance—as well as 
the liability risks—differ so considerably depending on whether we are 
talking about fraud that distorts market price (fraud-on-the-market) 
or fraud that affects a particular investment transaction, the answer 
would seem to be “yes.”  A stricter conception of duty makes sense in 
the open-market setting for the reasons set forth in Part II, and what 
follows is meant to address only that context. 
Two methods flow in a fairly straightforward manner from the exist-
ing case law on duty.  One is for the third party to identify itself, or allow 
itself to be identified, in such a way that would lead a reasonable investor 
to believe that it was assuming responsibility for the accuracy of the pub-
lic communication by the primary violator.  Words and phrases like “en-
dorsing” or “vouching for” capture this idea.110 
A second method is via a fiduciary relationship, or something suf-
ficiently akin thereto.  Corporate officers, directors, and other agents 
involved in the disclosure process are fiduciaries vis-à-vis the issuer and 
its shareholders, and this relationship has long been recognized to in-
clude a duty of candor.  This should suffice to create the requisite duty 
regardless of attribution, and it also becomes a reasonable (if some-
what awkward) basis for extending the fiduciary duty to the issuer as 
well.111  This duty, of course, is owed only to the insiders’ own investors. 
Beyond these, I would suggest three other circumstances that also 
work to create a relational duty.  The first is professional status or ex-
110 This is the plaintiff’s use of attribution as a sword, as opposed to defendant’s use 
of nonattribution as a shield, as occurs in so many of the cases.  See supra note 22 (de-
scribing cases in which plaintiffs were required to show attribution to state their claim). 
111 See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 105, at 1654-57 (discussing fiduciary duty in 
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, particularly in its relation to state common law concepts); 
Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary 
Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 475, 496 (2002) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court has also shown a marked re-
spect for the federal securities laws in cases involving the breach of the fiduciary duty 
of disclosure.”).  This is not to suggest that executives’ duty to speak is necessarily so ex-
pansive; again, that is a different question.  See United States v. Schiff, Nos. 08-1903, 08-
1909, 2010 WL 1338141, at *8-9 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (rejecting the fiduciary-based 
responsibility of an executive to correct misstatements made by another executive). 
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pertise in the world of finance that makes it reasonable to expect that 
the person or entity appreciates both the regulatory constraints and 
the economic harm that flows from misinformation spread into the in-
vestment marketplace.  This is one (and perhaps the only) way of mak-
ing sense of Stoneridge’s distinction between the worlds of commerce 
and finance:  more can reasonably be expected of those in the latter 
category.  There is room here to take account of the unambiguous ob-
ligations to the public that licensed securities professionals (broker-
dealers, investment advisers, etc.) have under the prevailing regulatory 
regime.  Conversely, we might also consider whether the nature of the 
third party’s professional obligations cut against a broad imposition of 
duty.  Lawyers’ duties are problematic, as many courts have recognized, 
because of the special obligations of zealous advocacy and confidential-
ity that apply as a matter of professional obligation.112 
The next duty circumstance is creative involvement in the ulti-
mate public deception—participation that is not simply substantial 
but actually helps to engineer or design that deception, thereby mak-
ing it more likely to succeed.  Schemes to defraud require planning 
and cleverness to avoid detection and have their desired effect.  Offer-
ing the brain power for a plan or arrangement merits the imposition 
of a duty.113  This concept ties to the idea in Stoneridge that the two 
third-party defendants were largely supernumeraries to Charter’s role 
as producer, director, and writer of the fraud, which points away from 
duty.  Where the third party itself produces, writes, or directs the 
scheme, the result should be different. 
Finally, borrowing from the aiding-and-abetting cases, a sufficient-
ly high form of purpose or desire to deceive investors in the general 
marketplace—“throwing one’s lot in” with the scheme or arrange-
ment—should probably satisfy the duty requirement, though I am not 
sure that it adds much to the other factors.  Here again, the presence 
of such specific intent to deceive the investing public removes some of 
the concern about disproportionality. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that someone violates Rule 10b-5 
with respect to another’s principal violation simply because a duty at-
112 See Abell, 858 F.2d at 1133 (stressing the importance of attorney-client privilege 
in the justice system).  Given the complexity of the issue and the fact that it has been 
debated so extensively elsewhere, I will not delve more deeply into the question of law-
yer’s liability here.  As a general matter, my inclination would be to hold lawyers liable 
as “immediate” primary participants in fraud-on-the-market cases only when they as-
sume creative control of the fraud or vouch for the accuracy of their clients’ disclosures. 
113 See infra Section IV.C (explaining liability premised on participation in a great-
er “scheme” to defraud). 
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taches.  All I am doing here is assessing whether the third party’s con-
duct is too attenuated or remote from the deception for there to be 
reliance on the part of the investing public, on the assumption that 
too much attenuation or remoteness makes it unfair to hold the third 
party liable for extraordinary fraud-on-the-market damages.  Without 
suggesting that these five possibilities are necessarily the only ways of 
imposing a duty, they do seem particularly well suited to Stoneridge’s 
framing of the issue.  In the next Part, we will see how these principles 
might be applied in specific cases. 
IV.  APPLYING DUTY 
As Stoneridge rightly suggests, third-party liability involves a con-
tinuum of causation, which can roughly be divided into three seg-
ments.  The first is when the third party assists but does not otherwise 
engage in a deceptive act.  Since Central Bank, this does not suffice for 
liability in a private lawsuit.114  The second is when the third party en-
gages in a deceptive act, but is a step or two removed from the disclo-
sure that is disseminated publicly.  This is the Stoneridge problem, and 
there, the Court says that if the deceptive act is too attenuated from 
the disclosure, there is no reliance on which to base liability.115  The 
final segment of causation is when the third party is integrally involved 
in the preparation of the public disclosure. 
One would think that the third category should be easy under 
Stoneridge, and I think it is.  The Court spoke of “immediate” involve-
ment in the disclosure as the opposite of attenuation,116 and—so far as 
reliance is concerned—the question should simply be whether the in-
volvement in the disclosure itself was indeed deep enough.  Because 
reliance was the principal ground on which the Court disposed of the 
claims against Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, however, we have to 
ask whether there might be other grounds on which third parties can 
escape liability even when their involvement is immediate and they 
acted with scienter.  Textually, the two remaining questions would be 
whether their conduct was itself deceptive, and if so, whether the de-
ception was “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security. 
114 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
115 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 
(2008) (“[Section] 10(b) . . . does not reach all commercial transactions that are frau-
dulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”). 
116 See id. at 160 (explaining that the inquiry is whether the act is “immediate or 
remote to the injury”). 
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On the first of these questions—deception—plaintiffs run into the 
line of authority discussed earlier:  in the eyes of at least some courts, 
there is no liability unless the public lie can somehow reasonably be 
attributed to the third-party defendant.117  Our first question, then, is 
whether Stoneridge has anything at all to say about this.  I think it does, 
albeit indirectly.  Then the question becomes how the duty-based 
analysis helps as the circumstances begin to move further away from 
direct involvement in the fraudulent disclosure. 
A.  Attribution 
Prior to Stoneridge, courts asked whether, in these situations, it was 
fair to say that the behind-the-scenes actor “made” a misrepresenta-
tion or “engaged” in a fraud, and so on.118  On this issue, many courts 
adopted the bright-line attribution standard, especially in Rule 10b-
5(b) cases, under which third-party liability simply would not follow 
unless the third party was publicly identified as responsible for the 
fraudulent disclosure.119  The Second Circuit was particularly demand-
ing.120  Elsewhere, some courts softened this requirement by suggest-
ing that attribution can be implicit, such as when investors are aware 
of the third party’s presence and could reasonably assume that the 
third party was involved in the particular disclosure.121  Others—
sometimes at the urging of the SEC in its amicus program122—have re-
jected the need for attribution altogether and employed other tests.123 
The most important lingering question is whether the attribution 
test survives Stoneridge.  Formally it does, because the standard was typ-
ically articulated as a question of conduct (i.e., what does it mean to 
“make” or “engage”), not one of reliance per se.  The Solicitor Gener-
al’s amicus brief specifically urged the Court not to rule on the attri-
117 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
118 See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 2001) (de-
clining to find primary liability under Section 10(b) when the “[p]laintiffs admit that no 
misrepresentations attributable to [the defendant] were ever made to [the p]laintiffs”). 
119 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
120 E.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring 
attribution before a secondary actor can be primarily liable for misstatements).  
121 See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2009) (permitting 
attribution when a court could “plausibly infer” that investors would have known about 
the secondary defendant’s involvement). 
122 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
123 See e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(expanding the scope of liability to deceptive conduct in a fraud “scheme”). 
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bution question for precisely this reason.124  Unfortunately, some low-
er courts have taken this as a reason to treat Stoneridge as having little 
or no relevance to defining deceptive conduct; as a result, they simply 
apply pre-Stoneridge law—most importantly, the bright-line attribution 
standard—to that question.  When they do refer to Stoneridge, it is 
without paying serious attention to what remoteness means. 
It is hard to find a useful place for attribution after Stoneridge.  
That test emerged shortly after Central Bank and was justified as neces-
sary to give meaning to the insistence on reliance in that decision.  In 
Stoneridge, however, the Court amply took care of that problem by 
promoting reliance as an independent inquiry in third-party liability 
cases.125  As a result, it is no longer necessary to alter the natural and 
normal meanings of “make” and “employ”—the only important words 
at issue—to address reliance. 
Also instructive is the Court’s brief discussion of whether there had 
to be a specific oral or written statement by the third party (or silence 
when there is a duty to disclose), to which the Court answers “no.”126  
This responded to the Eighth Circuit’s determination that mere con-
duct—like overpaying for set-top boxes or entering into useless adver-
tising arrangements—cannot be a fraudulent act.127  In arguing this is-
sue in the government’s amicus brief, the Solicitor General strongly 
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and asserted that the two defendants 
had employed a deceptive device or contrivance within the meaning of 
section 10(b).128  The Court does not go that far, at least explicitly, but 
it does agree that mere conduct can be fraudulent and that the lower 
court was therefore wrong on this aspect of its ruling.129 
This agreement is more significant than it seems.  If Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola did in fact employ a deceptive device or contriv-
ance, then the statutory standard for Rule 10b-5 liability is satisfied so 
124 See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22 n.12 (arguing that attribu-
tion did not need to be addressed in Stoneridge since no public statements had been 
made to investors). 
125 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 
(2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential 
element of the [section] 10(b) private cause of action.”). 
126 See id. at 158 (stating that it “would be erroneous” to conclude that an oral or 
written statement is required for liability). 
127 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(requiring that a defendant “make . . . a fraudulent misstatement or omission” to be 
liable), aff’d sub nom., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. 148. 
128 See Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing the defendants’ al-
leged conduct was a deceptive device since it allegedly misled Charter’s accountant).  
129 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158 (observing that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive”). 
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long as the deception was in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security and made with scienter.  “In connection with” has nothing to 
do with attribution, nor does state of mind.  So, if one follows this log-
ic, then there is simply no place left where attribution might be rele-
vant, except as to reliance.  And the Stoneridge Court showed no inter-
est in making it important there, either.  Put another way, in the face 
of a strict attribution rule, Stoneridge’s principle largely becomes use-
less, because lack of attribution disposes of most cases without trigger-
ing any inquiry into remoteness.  The only class of cases in which the 
principle would be relevant are those in which there is attribution, 
and it is hard to imagine many cases involving attribution that would 
raise significant remoteness issues.  To me, it is far more plausible that 
the Court wants its principle—not something so different and incon-
sistent—used to resolve these kinds of questions. 
To illustrate why an attribution rule makes no sense, consider a 
case (similar to many cases that have been litigated) in which a com-
pany executive deliberately misleads a securities analyst, who then is-
sues an excessively optimistic buy recommendation without quoting or 
referring to the executive.  The courts’ standard and sensible response 
has been that the executive and, derivatively, the issuer are liable.130  But 
this would not follow if we applied a strict attribution test.  The better 
approach—Stoneridge’s roadmap—is to ask whether the executive em-
ployed a deceptive device or contrivance and, if so, whether it was none-
theless too remote or attenuated from the recommendation on which 
investors relied.  Surely if the answer is yes to the first question, and no 
to the second question, such a result fully justifies the courts’ rulings in 
this area.  If the absence of attribution is not a problem here, why 
should it be a problem anywhere else?  In sum, attribution adds nothing 
of use to the law now that Stoneridge has addressed reliance by reference 
to remoteness and attenuation. 
That said, many lower courts have disagreed and assumed that 
Stoneridge gives them no reason to depart from their prior holdings.  
130 See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (declaring that a 
corporation “cannot escape liability simply because it carried out its alleged fraud 
through the public statements of third parties” (quoting Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 
F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996))); Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. 
Supp. 2d 59, 74-76 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining different courts’ perspectives on liability 
predicated on misleading analysts).  On the status of this idea in the Second Circuit, 
see In re Van der Moolen Holding N.V. Securities Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), in which the court held that misrepresentations in a company’s opera-
tions reports could be ascribed to a specific source, even when not explicitly attributed, 
because the information could only have been obtained from that source. 
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Why?  There is of course the natural psychological tendency—to which 
judges are as susceptible as anyone—to interpret new information in a 
way that justifies and maintains consistency with prior perceptions and 
actions.  I suspect Justice Kennedy likely aided this interpretation with 
his writing style and the harsh dicta he included in the opinion.131  He 
made it very easy for readers to think the decision was simply about re-
stricting third-party liability, which may have blinded them to the more 
moderate and flexible principle on which the decision turns. 
A Ninth Circuit case, In re Peregrine Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation, 
nicely illustrates how difficult it is to stay the course, and deserves its 
status as an opinion “not for publication.”132  The Circuit reads Stone-
ridge as requiring public knowledge of the improper behind-the-scenes 
transaction, not just the fact that the third party and the main wrong-
doer were doing business:  “[U]nder Stoneridge, which concerned simi-
lar allegations, these transactions cannot form the basis of [section] 
10(b) liability unless a ‘member of the investing public had know-
ledge . . . of [the business partner’s] deceptive acts’ sufficient to dem-
onstrate ‘reliance upon any of [the business partner’s] actions.’”133 
In fact, the quoted sentences in Stoneridge read like this, putting in 
italics all that the Ninth Circuit left out:  “No member of the investing 
public had knowledge, either actual or  presumed, of respondents’ decep-
tive acts during the relevant times.  Petitioner, as a result, cannot show re-
liance upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that 
we find too remote for liability.”134 
The Second Circuit’s strong reaffirmation of a strict attribution 
standard in Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP 135 
at least quotes accurately from Stoneridge, but it is no more open-
minded in its reasoning.  The court takes note of the remoteness lan-
guage, but simply decides that anything unattributed is thereby re-
mote—hardly a self-evident proposition.  It also confronts the argu-
ment that the outside counsel’s alleged deception to the company was 
in the world of investment, not the world of commerce, but finds this 
point to be of little significance.  Beyond that, the opinion is largely a 
repetition of the policy-based arguments underlying its initial adoption 
131 See, e.g., supra note 4. 
132 310 F. App’x 149 (9th Cir. 2009). 
133 Id. at 151 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159). 
134 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
135 No. 09-1619, 2010 WL 1659230 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2010).  
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of the bright-line test.136  The Second Circuit never acknowledges the 
possibility that the Supreme Court’s failure to embrace an attribution 
requirement, which would have been an easy way of disposing of the 
plaintiffs’ case against Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, might suggest 
that the Court favored the different and more nuanced way of address-
ing reliance set forth in the opinion. 
B.  Involvement in the Disclosure Itself 
If the attribution problem is surmounted, it becomes fairly easy—
and justifiable—to hold actors liable when they participate “imme-
diately” in the preparation of the fraudulent disclosure, assuming 
scienter.  Many of the factors set forth above work to justify the impo-
sition of a duty.  For example, many of the cases arising in this area in-
volve executives below the CEO or CFO level, who are nevertheless re-
sponsible for the document’s design and drafting.  Company managers 
involved in the disclosure process are fiduciaries, with a distinct duty of 
candor, and are on notice that they are working in the world of 
finance, not in ancillary business activity. 
One case in this spirit—part of the small handful in which Stone-
ridge has been read to support plaintiffs’ claims—is New York City Em-
ployees’ Retirement System v. Berry, which involved claims against the for-
mer general counsel at Juniper Networks, Inc., alleging that she 
falsified corporate documents as part of an options-backdating 
scheme.137  The court determined that she would be primarily liable 
for the falsifications, even with respect to those SEC filings that she 
prepared but did not sign.138  The court considered her the main cause 
of the falsifications, given her level of responsibility at Juniper for both 
136 The court does not follow Justice Kennedy’s lead in dicta, arguing that the 
bright-line approach is good policy because it protects third parties, like lawyers and 
bankers, from unnecessary litigation and because it is easy to apply.  Instead, it states 
that a strict test “avoids protracted litigation and discovery aimed at learning the identity 
of each person or entity that had some connection, however tenuous, to the creation of 
an allegedly false statement.”  Id. at *10.  This is familiar rhetoric, but it ignores the 
PSLRA’s imposition of heightened pleading requirements, which require specific facts 
in the complaint that give rise to a strong inference of the defendant’s scienter before 
even getting to discovery.  See infra note 171.  Nor does the court consider seriously the 
policy implications of a rule that invites secondary actors to instigate fraudulent conduct 
but then avoid liability to investors just by hiding from public view.  In sum, the policy-
based reasoning is unlikely to be persuasive to anyone not already convinced of the dis-
utility of private securities class actions as a compensatory or deterrence mechanism.   
137 616 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
138 See id. at 995-96 (holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Berry’s substan-
tial participation in the false statements). 
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compensation and financial reporting; her conduct thus made the fal-
sity both necessary and inevitable.139  This, in turn, supplied the neces-
sary proximity and immediacy to distinguish Stoneridge factually. 
In Berry, the general counsel was truly integral to the fraudulent 
disclosure.140  Cases become more difficult when the involvement in 
the disclosure is slightly less central.  Merely being proximate to the 
fraud is probably not enough to create primary liability, even for fidu-
ciaries.  Active engagement in the deception is necessary.  What seems 
most relevant is participation in the creative aspect of drafting the dis-
closure—involvement of the sort that makes the deception more likely 
to work.  This could sometimes happen through editing or comment-
ing, though the most common kind of third-party review probably 
rarely rises to this level.  I have for some time believed that “co-author-
ship”—one of the other duty examples—captures this idea of creative 
involvement fairly well.141 
A number of cases have arisen based on claims that a company 
executive was responsible for alleged fraud by supplying misinforma-
tion to the disclosure team.  Take, for example, a situation in which a 
vice president of marketing (or another key sales executive) arranges 
deals with customers that facilitate inappropriate revenue recognition.  
The arrangements are misrepresented in the preparation of the ac-
counts and hence fool the company’s auditors (and perhaps others) 
involved in the reporting and disclosure process.  A duty-based analy-
sis says that liability is appropriate, especially if the fraud was specifi-
cally designed to fool others inside the company (thereby making it 
more “inevitable” that it would succeed).  Especially in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley reporting environment, internal corporate proce-
dures for financial reporting extend widely into the company, so that 
all key employees should understand that they are an integral part of 
139 See id. at 996 (explaining that Berry’s oversight responsibilities of the option 
grant process created primary “scheme” liability). 
140 Id. at 990 (describing how general counsel helped to falsify financial statements). 
141 I suggested this standard shortly after Central Bank.  See Langevoort, supra note 
19, at 892 (proposing that “involvement” be based on a broad conception of co-
authorship).  The SEC has continued to recommend a test that is very similar:  the test 
asks whether the defendant can fairly be said to have “created” the fraud—at least in 
Rule 10b-5(b) cases.  See Brief for Securities Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, In 
Support of the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the Issue Addressed and in Support 
of Neither Affirmance nor Reversal at 7, In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-1619); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERI-
SA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 772 n.149 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing the SEC’s rec-
ommendation in In re Refco). 
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the disclosure process.142  Surely a distortion of material information 
by a high-level executive is enough so that the person can fairly be 
said to have engaged in a fraud, not just assisted with one.  At least 
one post-Stoneridge case, however, has disagreed—though largely on 
the assumption that the attribution test still prevails.143 
C.  Scheme Cases 
Stoneridge was decided in the shadow of the much larger Enron lit-
igation, which raised many of the same issues.  Because Enron was in-
solvent, the focus of litigation was against a set of investment banking 
firms and law firms that allegedly assisted Enron in structuring scores 
of transactions that operated deceptively and thus enabled Enron to 
report its financial condition fraudulently.  Perhaps the most famous 
of these transactions was the “Nigerian Barges Transaction” structured 
by Merrill Lynch, which disguised what was effectively a loan as a pur-
chase and sale.144  Some of the banks settled with the plaintiffs for 
more than $7 billion after the trial court ruled that their actions could 
constitute a primary violation of the law.145 
In Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston 
(USA), Inc., the Fifth Circuit reversed, freeing the nonsettling defen-
dants from liability exposure in the Rule 10b-5 portion of the law-
suit.146  Like Stoneridge, this opinion can be read in a number of differ-
ent ways.  Its emphasis on duty is most striking.  Language early in the 
substantive portion of the opinion suggests that liability under Rule 
10b-5 can never arise unless the defendant had a duty to disclose.147  
However, it is not clear that the court really meant to say, for instance, 
that Merrill Lynch itself would have escaped liability had it publicly 
142 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2009) (requiring an issuer to implement and eva-
luate a system of internal financial reporting controls). 
143 See SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 357-58 (D.N.J. 2009) (find-
ing allegations of a “chain of causation” insufficient to hold defendants primarily lia-
ble); cf. SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1257-62 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining “to impose 
an attribution element in an SEC enforcement action”). 
144 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the sham transactions used to inflate re-
ported revenues). 
145 See id. at 379 (explaining the previous settlements would offset any potential 
damages award in the present action). 
146 See id. at 393-94 (holding that neither the class-reliance presumption nor the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption served to establish defendants’ liability). 
147 See id. at 384 (“For us to invoke the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance on an 
omission, a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant owed him a duty of dis-
closure.” (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972))). 
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misrepresented its dealings with Enron.  Later on, the court turned 
specifically to the meaning of “deception” in the context of an alleged 
scheme to defraud and embraced the Eighth Circuit’s reading, which 
insisted on either a third-party defendant’s actual misstatement or 
failure to disclose when there was a duty to disclose148—precisely the 
approach that the Supreme Court later rejected as unduly restrictive.  
The bottom line is stated clearly enough, however:  “Enron had a duty 
to its shareholders, but the banks did not . . . . The banks’ participation 
in the transactions, regardless of the purpose or effect of those transac-
tions, did not give rise to primary liability under [section] 10(b).”149 
Immediately after Stoneridge, the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in the Enron case,150 which suggests that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may 
be consistent with the Court’s decision.151  That, however, is unfortu-
nate.  At the very least, the Fifth Circuit was sympathetic to the Eighth 
Circuit’s approach to what constitutes deception (i.e., the require-
ment that there must be either an affirmative misstatement or silence 
in the face of a duty to disclose), which is why duty plays such an im-
portant role in the court’s analysis.  The Supreme Court squarely re-
jected this approach, which renders the analysis suspect in its entirety.  
If we shift to the Supreme Court’s inquiry into remoteness or attenua-
tion, there are striking differences between the two cases.  Most nota-
bly, the transactions in Enron were not normal commercial arrange-
ments, but rather deals with investment bankers—registered broker-
dealers—who were deeply involved in the world of finance.152  Even 
putting aside the interesting question of how much of the creative de-
sign of these deals was the bankers’ work product, the nature of the 
engagement was plainly a giant step closer to the issuer’s misrepresen-
tation of its financial condition.  In terms of the duty test suggested 
earlier, the banks’ involvement was far from attenuated, having most 
assuredly—if plaintiffs’ allegations about knowledge were right—
thrown in their lot with Enron’s insiders. 
148 See id. at 388 (approving the Eighth Circuit’s definition of “deceptive” conduct 
(internal citation omitted)).   
149 Id. at 390. 
150 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 552 
U.S. 1170 (2008) (mem.), denying cert. to Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse 
First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).  
151 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 600, 640 
(S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Because the majority’s particular holding . . . was not granted a writ 
of certiorari and was not overturned nor even implicitly affected by Stoneridge, it is 
binding on this Court.”). 
152 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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The doctrinal difference, then, is that the Fifth Circuit was think-
ing of duty solely in its contemporary “duty to disclose” guise, and had 
found the absence of such a duty to be dispositive of the broader 
question of whether the banks had engaged in a deceptive act or prac-
tice.  This analysis confuses two distinct duty questions.153  If banks are 
assumed to have affirmatively engaged in a deceptive communicative 
act through the way they structured the behind-the-scenes transac-
tions—meaning that these deals were made with the purpose and in-
tent of fooling Enron’s auditors and other gatekeepers—the remain-
ing question becomes whether that behavior was too remote from 
Enron’s financial reporting to fairly charge the banks with responsibil-
ity to injured investors.  I doubt it. 
A similar lack of insight post-Stoneridge can be found in a Seventh 
Circuit case, Pugh v. Tribune Co.154  The allegation in Pugh was that the 
publisher and certain other insiders of two Spanish-language news-
papers engaged in a scheme to inflate the newspapers’ revenues by 
lying to advertisers about their circulation through an audit interme-
diary, who was tasked with verifying the data in question.155   
A subsidiary of the Tribune Company, a public company, owned the 
newspapers,156 and as a result of the scheme, Tribune’s financial re-
ports were materially misleading.157  The Seventh Circuit invoked 
Stoneridge to dismiss the action against the alleged mastermind, saying 
that, even assuming the publisher foresaw and/or intended that the 
scheme would result in Tribune making misleading financial state-
ments, the “indirect chain to the contents of false public statements 
[was] too remote to establish primary liability.”158 
Here again, some distinctions seem obvious.  Most notably, the sup-
posed mastermind was a senior official of a Tribune subsidiary.  He owed 
a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary, which presumably ran to Tribune and 
its shareholders.  Here, in other words, we have a fairly conventional duty 
of candor that the court could have invoked had it wished.  The fact that 
this was a parent-subsidiary relationship, rather than a purely intra-
corporate one, should make no difference in applying this type of duty. 
153 See supra text accompanying note 86 (comparing an affirmative duty to disclose 
to duty arising out of reliance). 
154 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008). 
155 See id. at 690 (explaining that falsely raising circulation figures permitted the 
employees to charge advertisers higher rates that, in turn, increased revenues). 
156 Id. at 690-92. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 697. 
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D.  Other Uses of Duty 
The approach to duty I have developed here could work very ef-
fectively to inform the “in connection with” requirement.  Instead of a 
simple foreseeability analysis—which creates a very broad liability 
threat—a court might say that, absent evidence of a specific intent, 
such as desire or motivation to deceive investors, liability for fraud-on-
the-market requires a duty to the marketplace.  That would encompass 
deception by issuers (and their officers and directors), underwriters, 
accountants, investment bankers, brokers, and so forth, but not those 
more remote from the resulting trading.  This would actually explain 
the Nortel case, discussed earlier,159 far better than its own reasoning. 
Consider the following scenario from another case.160  A well-
known mutual fund portfolio manager was interviewed in the finan-
cial press, and during the conversation, was asked about particular 
stocks held by the fund; he said that he considered the technology 
stocks to be very sound investments.161  However, the manager was in 
fact aware that the fund had begun dumping its technology stocks, but 
since he had no obligation to disclose, he declined to do so in order 
to prevent the stock market price from dropping.162  Assuming that 
this should be treated as a lie in the first place, is the manager—and 
derivatively, the fund’s sponsor—liable for a potentially massive sum to 
all investors who purchased the stocks between the time of the lie and 
the revelation of the fund’s sales?  One can see why this result might 
seem excessive.  Use of an invigorated duty analysis here could absolve 
the defendants of liability because the manager’s fiduciary and statuto-
ry duties ran to the fund’s investors, not to those in the portfolio com-
panies.  Moreover, his statement did not seem to be part of a delibe-
rate attempt to manipulate the market for those stocks.163 
159 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
160 In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1997). 
161 Id. at 541. 
162 Id. at 541-42. 
163 In SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 448-49 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc), the First Cir-
cuit overturned a panel decision, SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008), that 
had adopted a broad, duty-based view that underwriters implicitly “make” a misstate-
ment contained in a disclosure document prepared by a mutual fund adviser.  The en 
banc court said that even if underwriters owe special duties to investors to investigate 
the securities they offer, that does not automatically turn into a distinct duty to speak.  
Absent such a duty or some form of endorsement, they cannot be held liable for 
statements made by another party.  Tambone, 597 F.3d at 447-48. 
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V.  LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
I have put forth a reading of Stoneridge at odds with the conventional 
account.  I do not expect that courts will promptly jettison their own 
contrary readings and adopt my duty-based interpretation.  Among oth-
er things, there is so much dicta in Justice Kennedy’s opinion—about 
the scourge of strike suits, American capital-market competitiveness, and 
the like—that courts committed to a more restrictive interpretation can 
freely pick among the given reasons to stay the conservative course. 
If this is true, then only legislation will change the direction of the 
law, and I favor that.  We are in the midst of an economic crisis that has 
produced a high degree of sensitivity to greed and irresponsibility and a 
recognition that the complexity of financial engineering can readily 
conceal risk—systematic as well as firm- or industry-specific—and there-
by promote excess.  As a political matter today, if we were to ask 
whether an otherwise complicit financial engineer should be spared 
liability to investors simply because she is not identified as responsible 
for the publicly-transmitted falsity, the popular answer would almost 
surely be “no.”  Unsurprisingly then, there have been legislative initia-
tives to rewrite the standard for secondary liability.164 
This brings us to the challenge of finding the right definition.  If I 
am correct that the unease that has produced much of the restrictive-
ness of third-party liability doctrine is a legitimate fear of dispropor-
tion, then any line that simply divides secondary actors into two 
groups—those who face full fraud-on-the-market damages and those 
who face no damages at all—will inevitably be unsatisfying. 
The solution would be to address damages first, and then turn to 
the scope of liability.  This approach could be a systematic reform of 
Rule 10b-5 damages to address the overcompensatory bias discussed 
earlier—something I would favor in principle—but this would be a 
daunting and politically sensitive undertaking, with issues going well 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Thus, for now, let us stay focused on 
the third-party-liability problem. 
There are two plausible approaches.  One, recently recommended 
by John Coffee, Jr., is to create liability “caps” for secondary actors.165  
164 See Malini Manickavasagam, Ceiling on Damages Urged for Bill to Restore Aiding and 
Abetting Liability, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1725 (Sept. 21, 2009) (discussing the 
testimony and hearings on S. 1551, the bill for the “Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
Securities Violations Act”). 
165 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law 
Sch., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the United States 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary 10 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http:// 
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For entities, Coffee recommends that a penalty not exceed the greater 
of 10% of the defendant’s average income over its last three years, 10% 
of the defendant’s net worth, or 10% of the defendant’s total market 
capitalization.166  For natural persons, Coffee suggests a penalty of $2 
million but in no event more than $50 million.167  I am generally quite 
sympathetic to redefining liability exposure in all Rule 10b-5 cases,168 
and I would not be opposed to this approach.  But it does seem that 
redefining liability for third-party actors is awkward if it is not part of a 
more general effort to reform private securities litigation.  Restricting 
liability for secondary actors essentially leaves the bulk of the liability 
on the issuer, and it is far from clear that this is always appropriate.  It 
also takes questions of the degree of involvement and culpability out of 
the liability inquiry; the nonissuer mastermind of the fraud would have 
the same limited liability as the less culpable participant. 
An alternative is to revisit proportionate liability and revise section 
21D(f) from scratch.  The first question is who should face the full 
force of those damages, overcompensatory fears notwithstanding.  My 
articulation would build on, rather than reject out of hand, the sim-
plistic “actual knowledge” standard now in the law.  I would say that 
full-scale liability should attach if, but only if, the defendant acted with 
actual knowledge of the fraud and bore primary responsibility for its 
commission.  Primary responsibility arises when the person was a mov-
ing force in the design and execution of the deception.  The proposal 
would permit more than one person to have primary responsibility. 
For those who violate Rule 10b-5 but do not bear primary respon-
sibility, the factfinder (I would make it the judge169) should have re-
viewable discretion to limit damages to defendants’ fair share in light 
of (1) the severity of the injury to investors and (2) the nature and 
judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4052 (follow hyperlink under “Witness 
Testimony”) (proposing a ceiling for the maximum penalty that may be imposed on 
secondary participants so that punishments are “sufficiently painful to deter, but not so 
large as to threaten insolvency”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.   
168 See Langevoort, supra note 62, at 657-62 (considering which caps or alternative 
measures would be appropriate to achieve deterrence in liability standards). 
169 There is an important constitutional question about how much authority over 
factual questions, in the name of litigation reform, Congress can take away from the 
jury and assign to the judge in light of the Seventh Amendment.  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Ma-
kor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that the Seventh 
Amendment does not restrict the ability of Congress to assign a strong gatekeeping 
role to the trial judge.  See 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (listing cases in which there 
had been no Seventh Amendment violation). 
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culpability of defendants’ involvement, as compared to the actions of 
those with primary responsibility.  This formulation is deliberately 
open-ended but not particularly moreso than the current statutory lan-
guage, and it avoids the silliness of having to apportion fair shares to re-
sponsible parties that sum to one hundred percent.  The duty factors 
set forth earlier would be a useful way of assessing relative culpability.170 
More than open-endedness, a concern with this approach is its 
post hoc application.  Most cases never get to trial, and the indetermi-
nacy of fair share could cast a shadow of fear that would undercut the 
purposes of proportionate liability.  I am not sure how much of a 
problem this is—settlement bargaining today already takes place in 
the face of considerable factual and legal uncertainty, yet the results 
nonetheless seem reasonably responsive to the underlying merits171—
but if it is problematic, one solution would be to have the trial judge 
make a preliminary assessment based on the particularized allegations 
set forth in the pleadings at the same time that the judge rules on 
whether there is a strong enough inference of liability in the first place. 
This might seem frustrating to plaintiffs and their lawyers.  But the 
payoff is that it clears the way to expand the standard for secondary 
liability with substantially lessened risk of disproportionality.  Addi-
tionally, though there could be many ways to expand third-party liabil-
ity, there are no good reasons why Congress should not simply restore 
aiding-and-abetting liability once a fairer and more proportionate sys-
tem for assessing damages is in place. 
The defense-side objections to such a restoration are predictable, as 
are the responses.  The point to remember is that aiding and abetting is 
already both a federal crime and a violation of the Securities Exchange 
Act, with considerable liability consequences.  Restoration only adds an 
additional civil forum for redress, and stronger proportionate liability 
reduces the risks considerably.  To be sure, there is the concern that 
low-merit litigation will systematically force unfair settlement payouts, 
to which Justice Kennedy unfortunately once again gave voice.172  How-
ever, given the changes the PSLRA (which courts have construed fairly 
170 See supra Section III.C. 
171 See, e.g., Marilyn Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More?  The Impact of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 649 (2006) (concluding 
from an empirical study of the impact of the PSLRA that there is “some evidence that 
the merits do matter more, at least in the filing of complaints and the allegations in-
cluded in those complaints”). 
172 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 
(2008) (“[The] extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a 
lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies.”). 
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conservatively in the almost fifteen years since its enactment173) 
brought to the law, it is hard to believe that low- or no-merit lawsuits 
systematically survive motions to dismiss so as to pose pervasive strike-suit 
threats.174  The shift toward institutional lead plaintiffs has also re-
freshed the litigation environment by diminishing the autonomy of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.175  Perhaps additional reforms are warranted.  But as-
suming that Congress is comfortable with whatever system is in place for 
balancing the risks of excessive and inadequate liability, that same sys-
tem should be used to address the secondary liability problem. 
CONCLUSION 
While I hope that lower courts will be more imaginative and care-
ful in their interpretation of Stoneridge in future cases, early reader 
reactions to any authoritative text are hard to dislodge, even if they 
are careless.  I am certainly postmodern enough not to suggest that 
there is ever a single meaning or intention discoverable in any text, 
including a Supreme Court opinion.  Thus I will concede that the 
reading I have given to Stoneridge here is just one of many possibilities, 
and that it strikes me as far more plausible than the more familiar 
ones in circulation likely reflects my own prior beliefs:  I have long 
been troubled by the disproportionality problem, and I am thus in-
clined to construe Justice Kennedy’s ambiguous text in that light.  
Still, I am convinced that this is the most sensible reading. 
My duty-based reading interprets the reliance requirement (i.e., 
“duty within reliance”), because that is all the Court addressed.176  
However, there is no need to confine it in this way.  As we have seen, 
173 See cases cited supra notes 7-8. 
174 There is evidence that the PSLRA has been imprecise in its impact, allowing 
cases with merit to be thrown out and cases without merit to survive.  See Stephen J. 
Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-1507 (2004) 
(surveying empirical evidence on the PSLRA’s effect on both frivolous and meritorious 
suits); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 913, 929-42 (detailing evidence showing that the passage of the PSLRA 
failed to decrease nonmeritorious filings, despite the Act’s intentions). 
175 See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There are Plaintiffs and . . . There 
are Plaintiffs:  An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
355, 356 (2008) (explaining that the lead-plaintiff provision, which replaced the “first to 
file” rule, prevents plaintiffs’ attorneys from making “hair trigger” filings); Elliott J. 
Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to 
My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 551-53 (2008) (explaining that institutional lead plain-
tiffs have come to act as “reasonably diligent litigation monitors,” negotiating with plain-
tiffs’ attorneys at arm’s length and overseeing the settlement of their claims). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. 
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there is no reason why the line between primary liability and aiding and 
abetting should not be drawn by focusing on the remoteness or attenu-
ation of the third party’s involvement in the same way.  So, too, does 
this apply with respect to standing to sue or even the jurisdictional “in 
connection with” requirement.177  In fact, a close look at recent case law 
shows a number of areas in which courts have used remoteness or at-
tenuation to assess liability, suggesting that this really may be a unifying 
idea in thinking about the scope of Rule 10b-5 more generally.178 
This reading has both the virtue and vice of moderation.  Those 
on the plaintiff/investor side of the long-standing debate over private 
securities litigation policy will not like it because Stoneridge is a useful 
symbol of judicial intolerance and derision, which they would like to 
destroy through legislation.  The defense/business side considers it a 
holy victory to be interpreted expansively, according more to its rhe-
torical vigor than to its specific holding.  So far, the latter construction 
has the upper hand in the lower courts.  I have attempted to move this 
debate toward compromise.  As noted, the strike-suit threat as a syste-
matic concern is far overstated, at least since the PSLRA.  So is fear of 
private litigation as a threat to U.S. competitiveness.  On the other 
hand, the claimed damages at stake can be disproportionate both to 
the aggregate of real investor-reliance injuries and to the severity of 
the misconduct in question.  This excess encourages too many mar-
ginal cases and distorts settlement negotiations.  The judicious course 
is to try to preserve appropriate private securities liability, for third 
parties and otherwise, but also to pull back on the excess. 
 
177 See supra Section III.A (describing the “in connection with” requirement). 
178 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(noting that, in assessing the extraterritorial scope of Rule 10b-5, the “absence of any 
allegation that the alleged fraud affected American investors . . . or capital markets” 
was a significant factor in the court’s ability to hear the claim), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
783 (2009) (mem.); see also Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing:  A Standing 
Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 
1092-96 (2010) (discussing the decision in Morrison and how to evaluate “conduct” in 
the context of international investments). 
